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MONEY OR NOTHING: THE ADVERSE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
UNCOMPENSATED LAND USE CONTROLS 
JONATHAN H. ADLER* 
Abstract: The conventional wisdom holds that requiring compensation 
for environmental land use controls would severely limit environmental 
protection efforts. There are increasing reasons to question this assump-
tion. Both economic theory and recent empirical research-focused pri-
marily on the Endangered Species Act but potentially applicable to other 
environmental regulations that create similar incentives-demonstrate 
that failing to compensate private landowners for the costs of regulation 
discourages voluntary conservation efforts and can encourage the de-
struction of environmental resources. The lack of a compensation re-
quirement also means that land use regulation is "underpriced" as com-
pared to other environmental protection measures for which government 
agencies must pay. This results in the "overconsumption" of land use 
regulations relative to other environmental protection measures that 
could be more cost-effective at advancing conservation goals. Although 
any specific compensation prqposal would present implementation ques-
tions, there are reasons to believe that a compensation requirement could 
improve environmental conservation efforts. 
INTRODUCTION 
Private land is indispensable to environmental conservation. Most 
land-approximately two-thirds of the continental United States-is 
privately owned.1 The relative importance of such lands for the main-
tenance of species habitat and critical ecological functions is perhaps 
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sored by The DeVoe Moore Center, College of Social Sciences and The Program in Law, 
Economics and Business, College of Law, Florida State University, April 20-21, 2007. The 
author would like to thank Bruce Benson, Jonathan Entin, Catherine LaCroix, Andrew 
Morriss, J.B. Ruhl, Alex Tabarrok, and symposium participants for providing useful com-
ments and critiques on various iterations of this Article, as well as Tai Antoine, James ·wei-
kamp, and law librarian Lisa Peters for their research assistance. Any errors, omissions, or 
inanities are solely the fault of the author. 
1 U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., MAJOR USES OF LAND IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (2002). 
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even greater. A significant majority of those species currently listed as 
threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act (the 
"ESA")2 rely upon private land for some or all of their habitat.3 Most 
wetlands are in private hands as well. 4 For a variety of reasons, private 
land is also, on average, more productive for both economic and eco-
logical purposes.5 Without conservation on private lands, meaningful 
ecological conservation cannot be achieved.6 
Recognizing private land's importance for the achievement of 
environmental goals, federal, state, and local governments maintain 
extensive regulations on private land use. Such regulations typically 
limit or constrain development and other productive land uses, and 
can have a significant effect on land values.7 So long as a given regula-
tion, by itself, does not cause a "total wipeout," however, a landowner 
2 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
3 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES 
PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 4 (1994); see also]. BISHOP GREWELL & CLAY j. LANDRY, 
ECOLOGICAL AGRARIAN: AGRICULTURE'S FIRST EVOLUTION IN 10,000 YEARS 92 (2003) 
("Three-quarters of the wildlife in the U.S. live on farm and ranch lands."); Jodi Hilty & 
Adina M. Merenlender, Stuf~ying Biodivetsity on Private Lands, 17 CoNSERVATION BIOLOGY 132, 
133 (2003) (noting that ninety-five percent of endangered plant and animal species have 
some habitat on private land); Erin Morrow, The Environmental Fmnt: Cultuml Wmfm-e in the 
11-'t!st, 25 J. LAND REsouRCES & ENVTL. L. 183, 184 (2005) ("Private lands are essential to spe-
cies recovery .... "); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Private 
Role, 21 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 245, 249 (2002) (noting that "much of the key riparian land in the 
West is in private hands" and that "[s]ome valuable ecosystems today are found only on pri-
vate lands"); David S. Wilcove & Joon Lee, Using Economic and Regulatoty Incentives to Restore 
Endangered Species: Lessons Leanzed ji'D'In Three New Programs, 18 CoNSERVATION BIOLOGY 639, 
640 (2004) (noting that an estimate that "private lands harbor at least one population of two-
thirds of all federally listed species ... is almost certainly an underestimate"). 
4 Jon Kusler, Wetland Delineation: An Issue of Science or Politics?, ENVIRONMENT, Mar. 
1992, at 6, 29 (stating that approximately three-fourths of wetlands are on private land). 
5 See Hilty & Merenlender, supra note 3, at 133 ("Although there are exceptions, pl'i-
vate lands tend to be more productive, better watered, and higher in soil quality than pub-
lic land." (citing J. Michael Scott et al., Nature Reserves: Do They Capture the Full Range of 
Aml!lica's Biodiversity?, 11 EcOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 999, 999 (2001)) ). 
6 Stephen Polasky & Holly Doremus, When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on 
Private Land with Imperfect Information, 35 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 22, 22 (1998) ("Any 
effecti\'e species preservation policy will require conservation on private land."); John F. 
Turner &Jason C. Rylander, The P1ivate Lands Challenge: Integrating Biodiversity Conservation 
and Private Property, in PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: SAVING 
HABITATS, PROTECTING HoMES 92, 116 (jason F. Shogren ed., 1998) ("No strategy to pre-
serve the nation's overall biodiversity can hope to succeed without the willing participation 
of private landowners."). 
7 Geoffrey K. Turnbull, The Investment Incentive Effects of Land Use Regulations, 31 J. REAL 
EsT. FIN. & EcoN. 357, 365 (2005) ("[T]he consequence of [land use] regulation is typi-
cally evident in the form of diminished property value."). 
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is unlikely to be compensated for her loss.8 Only occasionally do fed-
eral courts require government agencies to compensate landowners 
for the costs of environmental land use controls.9 
It is generally assumed that a compensation requirement would 
undermine environmental conservation efforts. 10 There are reasons to 
question this assumption. A compensation requirement might alter the 
scope of federal regulatory limitations on private land use. Nonethe-
less, compensation need not come at the expense of environmental 
conservation.ll Requiring government compensation for environ-
mental land use regulations could actually be beneficial. Whether or 
not compensation is constitutionally required, as some argue, a com-
pensation requirement could increase the quantity and improve the 
quality of private land conservation.12 
Government agencies cannot be relied upon to provide the opti-
mal level of conservation on their own. 13 It is critical that government 
policy not inhibit nongovernmental conservation efforts, many of them 
undertaken by individuallandowners.14 Yet existing environmental land 
use controls have precisely this effect. Economic theory predicts, and 
recent empirical research on the ESA demonstrates, that failing to 
compensate private landowners for the costs of federal land use con-
8 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 ( 1992) (holding that a tak-
ing occurs when a "regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of 
land"). 
9 See Ira Michael Heyman, Property Rights and the Endangered Species Act: A Renascent As-
sault on Land Use Regulation, 25 PAC. LJ. 157, 162 (1994) (noting that "not one successful 
taking claim under the [Endangered Species] Act has been prosecuted in any Federal 
Court"). But see Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 
319-20 (Fed. Cl. 2001) (water use restrictions imposed under ESA constituted taking re-
quiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment). In the 1990s, Congress considered 
measures to 1·equire broader compensation under federal environmental Jaws, but such 
measures were not enacted. SeeS. 605, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995). 
Various property rights measures have passed in state Jegislan1res and by ballot initiative, 
however. See Private Property Rights Protection Act, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12-1134 (2007) 
(Arizona Jaw approved by voters in November 2006 providing for compensation or waiver 
of state or local land use regulations that reduce the fair market value of real property); 
OR. REv. STAT. § 195.300-.366 (2007) (Oregon law providing similar, but more limited, 
relief); Nancie G. Marzulla, Private ProjJert:y Initiatives as a ResjJonse to "Environmental Tah-
ings," 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 613, 633-38 (1995) (discussing passage of state-level property 
rights initiatives and legislation); Steven]. Eagle, The Bi1th of the PrvjJerty Rights Movement, 
PoL'v ANALYSIS, Dec. 15, 2005, 28-30 (same). 
1o See infra. notes 57-70 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 337-413 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 337-413 and accompanying text. 
13 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 255-56. 
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trols discourages voluntary conservation efforts and can encourage the 
destruction of environmental resources on private land. 15 Uncompen-
sated environmental land use controls cause many landowners to view 
environmental protection as a burdensome or hostile enterprise. 16 At 
the same time, failing to require compensation means that land use 
regulation is "underpriced" as compared to other environmental pro-
tection measures for which government agencies must pay. This results 
in the "overconsumption" of land use regulations relative to other envi-
ronmental protection measures and less effective environmental poli-
ciesP Taken together, these effects suggest that uncompensated regulatory 
takings1B are themselves a threat to greater environmental protection.l9 
This Article makes the environmental case for compensating land-
owners when environmental conservation measures restrict their ability 
to make productive use of their land. Part I provides an overview of the 
current debate over compensating landowners for the costs of envi-
ronmental land use controls.2° This debate has persisted since the onset 
of environmental land use regulation, the so-called "quiet revolution in 
land-use control, "21 that began in the 1960s. As a general matter, envi-
ronmental activists and supporters of such regulations have opposed 
compensation as cumbersome and unnecessary, whereas property 
rights activists and opponents of government land use controls have 
demanded compensation as a matter of economic efficiency and dis-
tributive justice. Both camps, however, have generally accepted that a 
compensation requirement would come at the expense of environ-
mental protections. This Article challenges that assumption. 
15 See infra notes 87-206 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 87-206 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 255-305 and accompanying text. 
IS The Fifth Amendment requires compensation for "regulatory takings," as they have 
been defined by the U.S. Supreme Court. See U.S. CoNST. amend. V; Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16, 1031-32. This Article 
uses the term "regulatory takings" in its more colloquial sense, to describe regulation that 
diminishes the fair market value of real property due to restrictions on traditional land 
uses. It is worth emphasizing that this Article does not seek to answer the question of 
when, if ever, compensation is constitutionally required under the Fifth Amendment, or 
whether such a requirement should be enforced in federal courts. 
19 The argument in this Article is not meant to discount the potential negative envi-
ronmental consequences of even compensated takings of private land. In at least some 
contexts, the use of eminent domain can be expected to produce negative envirorimental 
consequences as well. See Ilya So min & Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Casts oJKelo: Economic 
Development Takings and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 623, 623 (2006). 
20 See infra notes 37-70 and accompanying text. 
21 See FRED BossELMAN & DAviD CALLIES, THE QumT REvoLUTION IN LAND UsE CoN-
TROL 1-4 (1971). 
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Part II explains how uncompensated regulatory takings, such as 
those that result from environmental land use controls intended to 
conserve species habitat or other ecological values, create perverse, 
anti-environmental incentives for private landowners. 22 This Part ex-
plains the theoretical reasons why these incentives can be expected to 
result in the loss of species habitat and other ecological services on pri-
vate land.23 It also surveys recent empirical studies examining the con-
servation consequences of uncompensated land use controls under the 
ESA-studies that have been largely ignored within the environmental 
law literature to date. 24 It further explains how the imposition of land 
use regulations for conservation purposes can compromise efforts to 
collect scientific information about the status of ecological values on 
private lands, further undermining conservation goals.25 
Part III examines the incentives faced by government agencies 
engaged in environmental conservation efforts.26 Specifically, this Part 
demonstrates that government agencies face perverse incentives of 
their own when they do not have to provide landowners with compen-
sation for the costs of complying with land use controls barring devel-
opment on private lands.27 Insofar as private land uses are treated as 
"free goods" in this fashion, regulatory agencies can suffer from "fis-
cal illusion," and have an increased incentive to rely upon land use 
controls, even when other conservation measures would be more cost-
effective. As a result, the lack of compensation may encourage regula-
tory agencies to adopt suboptimal conservation strategies. 
Part IV mal(es the case for a compensation requirement that would 
help ameliorate the perverse incentives that plague current conserva-
tion efforts.2s Paying compensation would reduce l~mdowner opposi-
tion to environmental protection measures, alter the political incentives 
faced by agencies, and potentially reduce some of the political incen-
tives that further distort conservation policy on the margin. 29 
Adopting a compensation requirement is not a simple step, how-
ever. Attention would have to be paid to how such a requirement could 
best be implemented, given existing environmental statutes and pro-
22 See infra notes 71-243 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 159-206 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 207-225 and accompanying text. 
26 See inji·a notes 244-336 and accompanying text. 
27 See inji·a notes 255-305 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 337-413 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 337-413 and accompanying text. 
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grams, without creating additional perverse incentives. Part IV addresses 
some of these concerns before offeling some concluding thoughts.30 
Two qualifications are in order. First, this Article accepts the gen-
eral presumption in environmental policy that current conservation 
efforts, private and public combined, under-provide environmental 
amenities.31 The Article explains how the imposition of land use con-
trols-specifically requirements that owners refrain from altering or 
making economically productive use of the land-without compensat-
ing the landowners for the consequences of such restrictions, can re-
sult in less cost-effective environmental conservation programs and a 
net reduction in the quality and quantity of environmental conserva-
tion.32 Although other economic and equity concerns are important, 
they are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Second, this Article focuses on conservation-oriented land use 
regulations, as opposed to pollution controls. The focus of analysis is 
those government regulations that prohibit development and other 
activities that change the environmental amenities provided by a given 
parcel of land, rather than on those regulations that seek to prevent 
landowners from imposing pollution or other harms on neighboring 
properties.33 For instance, none of the sorts of activities prohibited as 
unlawful habitat modification under section 9 of the ESA would come 
close to constituting a common law nuisance.34 Although some activi-
ties regulated under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (the "CWA") 
30 See inji-a notes 337-416 and accompanying text. 
31 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulat01y Commons: A The01:"1 of Regulat01y 
Gaps, 89 IowA L. REv. l, 44-48 (2003) (arguing that a "regulatory commons" results in 
underregulation of environmental problems);John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying 
Landowners to Protect the Environment, 26]. LAND REsoURCES & ENVTL. L. I, 15 (2005). 
32 See inji·a notes 71-336 and accompanying text. On the other hand, if one believes 
that the optimal level of environmental conservation is less than that currently provided, 
then one may conclude that a compensation requirement may produce greater conserva-
tion, and that this could be less efficient. 
33 It is of course true that some, if not all, environmental harms are "reciprocal," inso-
far as they involve competing land uses. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
EcoN. 1, 2 (1960). Yet this economic insight is at odds with widespread contemporary un-
derstandings of what constitutes harmful conduct. 
34 See Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon; The Law and 
Economics of Habitat Preservation, 5 SuP. CT. EcoN. REv. 1, 13 (1997). But see Christine A. 
Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Spmwl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. 
REv. ll55, 1211 (1997) (noting that lower courts are increasingly recognizing the value of 
wetlands and at least one court has found that wetlands destruction constitutes an affirma-
tive nuisance). 
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could constitute nuisances in certain circumstances,35 the filling ofwet-
lands, as such, would not. Indeed, as Professor Richard Epstein ex-
plains, "It would take a stunning reversal of hundreds of years of legal 
history if these activities, generally productive, were now, for the first 
time, castigated by the common law as generally harmful. "36 This Arti-
cle does not consider-let alone endorse-a compensation require-
ment for regulations that control the imposition of pollution or other 
external effects onto neighboring properties or the public at large. 
Such a requirement would likely have quite different, and substantially 
more negative, environmental effects than the compensation require-
ment considered here. 
I. MoNEY FOR SoMETHING?-THE CoMPENSATION DEBATE 
·whether to compensate landowners subject to environmental land 
use controls for resulting economic losses has been debated since such 
regulations were first adopted. In the 1960s, there was a "quiet revolu-
tion in land-use control" as state and local governments began adopt-
ing a new generation of environmental protections aimed at encourag-
ing or requiring conservation on private lands. 37 Extending beyond the 
traditional bounds of urban zoning, and imposing greater limits on pri-
vate land use than the common law principles of nuisance, these new 
measures limited land development in order to preserve environmental 
values. A presidentially appointed task force on land use summarized 
the dominant ecological thinking in 1973: "tough restrictions will have 
to be placed on the use of plivately owned land" in order to protect 
critical environmental resources. 38 
As environmental land use controls were adopted, conservationists 
became concerned some measures could run afoul of the Fifth Amend-
ment requirement that governments compensate landowners when pri-
vate land is taken for public use.39 "Almost every state and local gov-
ernment that is trying to implement an environmentally-oriented land 
35 See generally].B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecologica~ 58 CASE W. REs. L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 2008). 
36 Epstein, supra note 34, at 29; see also James L. Huffman, Beware of Greens in Praise of 
the Common Law, 58 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008). 
3
' See BossELMAN & CALLIES, sujJm note 21, at 1-4. This history is briefly summarized 
in Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Futw·e of Conservation: Changing Percejllions of ProjJerty Rights 
& Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 987,992-1001 (2005). 
38 THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZEN'S POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 23 (William K. 
Reilly ed., 1973). 
39 U.S. CaNST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without 
just compensation"). 
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regulatory system finds itself plagued with constitutional doubts," noted 
the authors of a 1971 report on the growth of state and local land use 
controls.40 Early court decisions concluding that environmental restlic-
tions could constitute uncompensated regulatory takings further stoked 
these fears. In 1970, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
found that restlictions on plivate land use under the Maine Wetland Act 
constituted an uncompensated "taking" in violation of the Maine consti-
tution.41 
A century earlier in 1872, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., the U.S. 
Supreme Court explained the rationale for applying a constitutional 
prohibition on uncompensated takings to actions otl1er than fee sim-
ple appropriations of private property: 
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in con-
struing a provision of constitutional law ... it shall be held 
that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion 
of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy its 
value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to 
any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction with-
out making any compensation, because, in the narrowest 
sense of tl1at word, it has not been taken for the public use. 42 
Property rights consist of a bundle of rights to make use of a given 
property. In Pumpelly, the Court recognized the incongruity of a rule 
that would enable the government to avoid the compensation re-
quirement by taking the use value of the land without taking title to 
the underlying fee. 43 In some instances, requiring land to be left in an 
undeveloped state could be tantamount to taking the land, or an in-
terest therein, for the public purpose of conservation. In effect, the 
government would be free to take "sticks" from the bundle at no cost 
to itself. For this reason, the regulatory takings inquiry focuses on the 
nature and extent of the government regulation, rather than on 
whether the government takes title to the regulated land.44 
40 BossELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 21, at 323. 
41 State v.Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970); see also joseph W. Gannon, Jr., Consti-
tutional Implications of Wetlands Legislation, 1 ENVTL. AFF. 654, 654-665 (1971) (discussing 
and critiquing the johnson decision). Gannon concludes that such cases "require the courts 
to be attentive to new scientific information and to shifting societal values." !d. at 665. 
42 SO U.S. (13 Wall.) 166,177-78 (1871); seealso]AMES W. ELY, THE GuARDIAN OF EVERY 
OTHER RIGHT: A CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 94 (3d ed. 2008). 
43 Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 177-78. 
44 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (articulat-
ing key factors in the regulato1·y takings inquiry). 
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In 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court applied this rationale to govern-
ment regulation in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.45 The Pennsylvania 
Coal Company challenged a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited coal 
mining that could cause surface subsidence, claiming this rule effec-
tively took their property without compensation in violation of the Tak-
ings Clause.46 Where a regulation "goes too far," Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes explained in his opinion for the Court, it constitutes a "taking" 
under the Fifth Amendment, because such regulation would be tanta-
mount to "appropriating or destroying" the property interest. 47 In such 
cases, compensation would have to be paid, or the statute would be de-
clared invalid. 48 If this rationale could apply to government regulation 
of coal extraction, as it did in Mahon, it could apply to other environ-
mental measures that prevent landowners from developing or other-
wise making productive use of their land. 49 
Despite the Court's holding in Mahon, there were relatively few 
successful challenges to land use regulations in subsequent decades.50 
When environmental land use controls started to become more re-
strictive in the 1960s, however, environmental advocates feared the 
Mahon holding might curtail such regulations. A 1973 report for the 
President's Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") on "the tak-
ing issue," warned that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause could 
be the "weak link" in efforts to protect environmental quality through 
land use control.51 Specifically, the authors feared that any compensa-
tion requirement would reduce the affordability of land use controls 
and hamper conservation.52 It concluded that "attempts to solve envi-
ronmental problems through land use regulation are threatened by 
the fear that they will be challenged in court as an unconstitutional 
taking of property without compensation. "53 
The authors of the CEQ report believed that it was necessary to 
"overcome" the takings problem in order to conserve environmental 
45 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922). 
46 ld. at 412. 
47 Jd. at 414, 415. 
46 ld. at 413 ("vVhen [regulation] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all 
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."). 
49 See id. at 413-15. 
5o See ELY, supra. note 42, at 119. 
51 FRANK BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TA!UNG IssUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIM-
ITS OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND 
WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS, at iv (1973). 
52 Id. at iv-v, 308-09. 
53 ld. 
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values.54 The burgeoning environmental crisis was too great to accom-
modate the "myth" that landowners could exercise unfettered control 
over their own property. 55 Along ,the same lines, the 1973 Task Force on 
Land Use and Urban Growth concluded that the doctrine of regulatory 
takings would have to be limited for environmental reasons.56 
The assumption that requiting compensation for costs imposed by 
environmental land use controls necessatily hampers environmental 
protection has persisted.57 Although some environmental economists 
support compensation on efficiency or environmental conservation 
grounds, environmental lobbying organizations are unanimous in their 
opposition to statutory or judicially imposed compensation require-
ments.58 According to the Sierra Club, takings compensation proposals 
54 See id. at v ("[I]f the challenge posed by the taking issue can be overcome we believe 
it will make a very significant impact on ·environmental quality.") . 
. 
55 !d. at 2 ("[I] n an increasingly crowded and polluted environment can we afford to 
continue circulation of the myth that tells us that the takings clause protects this right of 
unrestricted use regardless of its impact on society? Obviously not .... "). 
56 THE UsE OF LAND, supra note 38, at 24-25 ("Many Uudicial] precedents are anach-
ronistic now that land is coming to be regarded as a basic natural resource to be protected 
and conserved .... It is time that the U.S. Supreme Court re-examine its precedents that 
seem to require a balancing of public benefit against land value loss in every case and de-
clare that, when the protection of natural, cultural or aesthetic resoitrces or the assurance 
of orderly development are involved, a mere loss in land value is no justification for invali-
dating the regulation of land use."). The Task Force was created by the Citizen's Advisory 
Committee on Environmental Quality, "a body established by presidential executive order 
in May 1969." !d. at l. 
57 See, e.g., John Echeverria, The Tailing Issue, in LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE: WrsE UsE AND 
THE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 143, 148 (John Echeverria & Raymond Booth 
Eby eds., 1995) ('There can be little doubt that an expanded reading of the takings clause 
would in fact increase the cost of existing environmental programs and reduce the level of 
environmental protection Americans currently enjoy."); id. at 146 (arguing that the "bene-
ficiaries of regulation," including those who suffer from environmental harm and "future 
generations" would suffer from a compensation requirement}; Heyman, supra note 9, at 
158; Joseph L. Sax, Using Pmperty Rights to Attach Environmental Protection, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REv. 1, 2-3 (1996); Glenn P. Sugameli, Tailings Bills Threaten Private Property, People, and the 
Environment, 8 FoRDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 521, 522 (1997); see also David A. Dana, Natural Preser-
vation and the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 655, 656 (1995) (noting "the assumption 
underlying the affiliation of pro-preservation groups with the strict anti-compensation 
position"). But see E. Donald Elliott, How Takings Legislation Could Improve Environmental 
Regulation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1177, 1177 (1997); James W. Ely, Jr., Property Rights and 
Emrironmental Regulation: The Case for Compensation, 28 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 51, 52 
(2004) ("[S]crupulous regard for the constitutional l'ights of [property] owners is fully 
congruent with, and may even enhance, the achievement of sound environmental goals."). 
58 Some environmental organizations do, however, support incentive programs for 
landowners to lessen the impact of land use regulations on the margins. See Richard Stone, 
Incentives Offer Hope fo1· Habitat, 269 SciENCE 1212, 1212 (1995) (describing a report en-
dm·sing incentives and supported by scientists and land managers from environmental 
organizations, industry, and government). Groups supporting the use of "positive rein· 
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are part of "an overt and calculated attack on the environment," and 
"an assault on the guiding principle of virtually all laws governing air, 
water, and waste disposal."59 Glenn Sugameli of the National Wildlife 
Federation argued that paying compensation to landowners for envi-
ronmental restrictions would "impose massive costs on taxpayers" and 
"cause an inability to enforce protections for people, private property, 
and public resources."60 Others refer to the push for compensation as 
part of an "anti-environmental agenda"61 that might mean "the end of 
environmentallaw."62 Political efforts to subject environmental land use 
controls to the Fifth Amendment have "the potential to put all modern 
environmental and land use laws at risk."63 
Property rights activists and others who support greater compensa-
tion for the costs of environmental land use regulations rarely make 
environmental arguments for their position.64 To the contrary, some 
forcement" to encourage habitat conservation include the National Wildlife Federation, 
National Audubon Society, and Environmental Defense (formerly known as the Environ-
mental Defense Fund, or EDF). See id.; Audubon, Congress Weighs Expanding Species 
Protections with New Incentives for Landowners, http:/ /www.audubon.org/campaign/ 
esa/landownerlncentives.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007) (supporting legislation that in-
cludes incentives for habitat conservation); National Wildlife Federation, Help Private 
Landowners Protect Endangered Plants and Animals!, https:/ /online.nwf.org/site/Advo-
cacy?pagename=homepage&page= UserAction&id=259&s_src=ActionHQ (last \~sited Feb. 
20, 2007) (same); see also Thomas Eisner et al., Building a Scientificall), Sound Policy for Pmtect-
ingEndangered Species, 269 SciENCE 1231, 1232 (1995) (calling for "supplementing the law's 
regulatory requirements with economic incentives"). One environmental organization, 
Defenders of Wildlife, developed a program to compensate ranchers for the costs of wolf 
depredation in order to reduce landowner opposition to wolf reintroduction under .the 
ESA. See Todd G. Olson, Biodiversity and Private Proj;erty: Conflict or OjJportunity?, in BIODI-
VERSITY AND THE LAW 67, 71 (William]. Snape III ed., 1996) (discussing wolf compensa-
tion program); see also Defenders of Wildlife, The Bailey Wildlife Foundation Wolf Com-
pensation Trust, http:/ /www.defenders.org/programs:...and_policy /wildlife_conservation/ 
solutions/wolf_compensation_trust/index.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2007) (describing 
compensation program). 
59 Robert Braile, Enviros Scramble to Save Existing Laws, GARBAGE, Fall 1994, at 35; Frank 
Clifford, Bill Would Limit Federal Power over Environment, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1994, at AI. 
60 Sugameli, supra note 57, at 522. Sugameli further claimed that "the budgetary im-
pact of [takings] claims could have virtually the same practical effect as invalidating the law 
in question." !d. at 552. 
61 Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Anal)•sis and As-
sessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 509,510 (1998). 
62 !d. at 554. 
63 /d. at 562. 
64 Supporters of "free market environmentalism," on the other hand, have long stressed 
the negative environmental impacts of uncompensated land use regulations. See, e.g., Envi-
ronmental Regulations and Property Rights: Hearing on S. 605 and H.R 925 Before the S. Comm. on 
the Environment and Public Works, 104th Cong. 1-10 (1995) (statement of Jonathan H. Adler, 
Director of Environmental Studies, Competitive Enterprise Institute) (describing environ-
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are openly dismissive of environmental concerns. Instead of engaging 
environmental arguments directly, compensation proponents often 
make arguments about "fairness" and "efficiency. "65 They further stress 
that the underlying purpose of the Fiftl1 Amendment's Takings Clause 
was to prevent political majorities from imposing costs for the provision 
of public goods on less powerful minorities.66 
Regulating land use so as to obtain some of the benefits of owner-
ship entails costs, but these costs may seem to be significantly less if one 
need not pay for acquisition of tl1e property interest. Yet this does not 
make regulation c·ost-free. Providing public goods always entails costs to 
someone; a compensation requirement, "simply determines who that 
someone is. "67 As the New York Court of Appeals explained, if govern-
ment is not forced to compensate for property taken, "the ultimate 
economic cost of providing the benefit is hidden from those who in a 
democratic society are given the power of deciding whether or not they 
wish to obtain the benefit .... "68 When the cost of providing a public 
good is thus "successfully concealed, the public is not likely to have any 
objection to the 'cost-free' benefit."69 Why pay full-price for something 
that is available at a discounted price? If sticks from the bundle of rights 
are free for the taking, there is no reason to purchase the underlying 
fee. 
mental harms of uncompensated regulatory takings); Richard L. Stroup, Endangered Species 
Act: Making Innocent Species the Enemy, PERC PoLicY SERIES No. PS-3 (Apr. 1995), available at 
http:/ /wW'.v.perc.org/perc.php?id=648. 
65 See Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More Ef 
ficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 221, 222 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss 
eds., 2004) (noting the dominant arguments in favor of compensation stress either fair-
ness or efficiency); Echeverria, supra note 31, at 31 (summarizing fairness objection to 
uncompensated environmental regulations); J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act and Pri-
vate Property: A Matter of Timing and Location, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 37, 37 (1998) 
(noting that the debate over the ESA "takes for granted that landowners threaten species 
and that the ESA threatens landowners"); see also Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights 
Movement: How It Began and H-7zere It Is Headed, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990s' PROPERTY 
RIGHTS REBELLION 1, 5-7 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995); Eagle, supra note 9, at 2-3. 
66 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that the Takings Clause "was designed to bar government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole"); Eagle, supra note 65, at 23 (quoting justice Harlan). 
67 James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Private Rights: The 
Public Trust Doctrine and Resm·ved Rights Doctrine at Work, 3 J. LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. 171, 173 
n.9 (1987). 
6B Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 387 (N.Y. 1976) 
(citing Allison Dunham, Legal and Economic Basis for Planning, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 650, 665 
(1958)). 
69 Id. 
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Both those who support and oppose a compensation requirement 
appear to accept the same implicit premise: paying compensation will 
come at the expense of environmental conservation.7° Framed in this 
way, the choice becomes one between advancing fairness and efficiency 
concerns through compensation and promoting ecological values 
through uncompensated regulation. Too little attention is paid to the 
actual ecological consequences of uncompensated regulatory takings. 
Largely unasked is whether imposing land use controls without paying 
compensation actually serves environmental goals. It is to this question 
that this Article now turns. 
II. PERVERSE INCENTIVES FOR LANDOWNERS 
Environmental land use regulations limit the use or development 
of private lands tl1at provide valuable ecological services. Such regula-
tions impose significant costs on landowners, both economic and oth-
erwise. They may also reduce property values. 71 Land use restrictions 
may also impose subjective costs on landowners by disrupting tradi-
tional land uses or reducing the landowner's sense of ownership, 
autonomy, or controJ.72 As a consequence, government regulation in-
creases the costs of owning ecologically valuable land, and thereby dis-
courages the maintenance and protection of such lands by private 
landowners. 
The negative effect of uncompensated land use regulations on en-
vironmental conservation is best observed in the context of species 
conservation, though we should expect to observe similar phenomena 
any time environmental land use regulations impose significant, un-
compensated costs on plivate landowners. Under federal endangered 
species preservation regulations, landowners can be prohibited from 
modifying or destroying habitat on their own land, and this has had 
significant effects on landowner willingness to provide habitat for en-
dangered species.73 Insofar as other land use regulations operate in a 
similar fashion, and impose use restrictions on land that is undeveloped 
or has other environmentally desirable characteristics, they can be ex-
pected to produce equivalent results. Federal wetlands regulations un-
der section 404 of the CWA, for example, likely discourage wetland 
70 See supm notes 57-69 and accompanying text 
71 Turnbull, supra note 7, at 365. 
72 See generally MARGARET jANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35-71 (1993) (argu-
ing that property may be tied into an individual's sense of :identity and personhood). 
73 See 16 U.S. C.§ 1538 (2000); see infm notes 115-197 and accompanying text. 
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conservation and restoration on private land, and may even encourage 
land modifications that can destroy wetland characteristics. 74 
This Part first explains why, in theory, the imposition of private 
land use controls can be expected to discourage landowners from cre-
ating or maintaining ecosystem services on their land. 75 This discussion 
focuses primarily on the incentives created for landowners under sec-
tion 9 of the ESA, specifically the incentives against maintaining and 
protecting species habitat.76 Otl1er regulatory programs tilat operate in 
a similar fashion can be expected to produce equivalent incentives. 
Although tl1ere is some debate in the economic literature about 
whether a compensation requirement would produce more efficient 
land use patterns, there is a reasonably broad consensus that-at least 
in the context of habitat conservation and some other environmental 
amenities-a failure to compensate landowners will produce significant 
negative environmental effects on the margin. 77 Because much land-
owner behavior is unobservable, perfect enforcement of land use con-
trols is impossible. This makes tile marginal incentives created by regu-
latory controls particularly important. · 
The validity of economic models and theoretical claims must ulti-
mately be tested against the evidence. With that in mind, this Part next 
surveys the extensive range of anecdotal evidence supporting the theo-
retical prediction that uncompensated takings under the ESA are bad 
for species.78 Anecdotes can only prove so much, however.79 Therefore, 
the discussion that follows summarizes several recent empirical studies 
regarding the consequences of uncompensated regulatory takings on 
the provision of habitat on private land.80 The studies conducted to 
date uniformly support tile hypothesis that section 9 of the ESA harms 
species conservation efforts on private land because of the incentives it 
creates.81 These studies, which have received minimal attention in the 
environmental law literature,82 offer important empirical evidence tl1at 
74 See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text. 
75 See infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text. 
76 See infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text. 
77 See infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text. 
78 See infra notes 115-158 and accompanying text. 
79 Cf Nelson W. Polsby, vVhm Do You Get Your Ideas?, 26 PS: PoL. Scr. & PoL. 83, 83 
(Mar. 1993) (quoting Raymond Wolfinger, "[T]he plural of anecdote is data .... "). 
80 See infra notes 164-197 and accompanying text. 
81 See infra notes 164-197 and accompanying text. 
82 A Westlaw search of the TP-ALL database (all law reviews, texts, and bar journals) 
for the four studies discussed in Part II.C was conducted in August 2007, and again on 
October 16, 2007. Of the four studies, only two were cited in any articles, and only one by 
anyone other than this author. The other two studies have not been cited in the legal lit-
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uncompensated regulatory takings under the ESA have a significant 
negative impact on species conservation efforts.83 
Uncompensated land use regulations imposed under the ESA 
also appear to inhibit scientific research and the collection of data 
about species on private lands.84 Thus, this Part also considers the an-
ecdotal and empirical evidence that uncompensated regulatory tak-
ings frustrate efforts to enhance the knowledge base and improve our 
scientific understanding about the plight of endangered species and 
the habitats upon which they depend.85 This Part concludes by sug-
gesting that uncompensated land use regulations may help explain 
the ESA's poor recot"d of species conservation on private land.86 
A. Theoretical Predictions 
Many environmental land use controls were adopted with little 
consideration of the perverse incentives they could create.87 Environ-
mental regulations that limit a private lattdowner's ability to use her 
land due to its ecological value discourage the maintenance (let alone 
creation or enhancement) of environmental amenities.88 Such regula-
tions increase the cost of owning species habitat, wetlands, and other 
ecologically valuable lands. sg 
erature at all, save for a reference to the unpublished manuscript of one study in one of 
the other smdies. 
83 See infra notes 164-197 and accompanying text. 
84 See infra notes 207-225 and accompanying text. 
85 See infra notes 207-225 and accompanying text. 
86 See infra notes 226-243 and accompanying text. 
87 See Turnbull, supra note 7, at 360 ('The economic arguments traditionally used to 
justifY land use controls and regulations are static in nature; they do not incorporate the 
intertemporal adjustments that market participants make in response to policy propos-
als."); Symposium, Environmental Law, Wetlands Regulation, and Reform of the Endangered SjJe-
cies Act, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y REv. 747, 774-75 (2007) (comments of John 
Kostyack) [hereinafter William & Mary Symposium] ("[T]he [ESA] was passed in 1973 as a 
fundamental regulatory law, and did not have many of the carrots that most people recog-
nize are going to be necessary to get people doing positive things on the land."). 
88 See infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text. 
89 See, e.g., Thomas]. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Government Regulation and Compensa-
tion for Takings: Implications for Agriculture, 77 AM. ]. AGRIC. EcoN. 1177, 1177 (1995) 
("[W]hether or not compensation is paid for such changes in government policies [re-
stricting land use] can affect the value of agricultural land, as well as other land (e.g. for-
estland) .... ").As Sam Hamilton, former Fish and Wildlife Service administrator for the 
State of Texas explained with regard to the ESA: 'The incentives are wrong here. If I have a 
rare metal on my property, its value goes up. But if a rare bird occupies the land, its value dis-
appears." Betsy Carpenter, The Best-Laid Plans, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Oct. 4, 1993, at 
89. 
316 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 49:301 
The landowner who defers the decision to develop is "opening 
himself to the risk that ... development prohibition[s] will be imposed 
at some point in the future before the land is developed. "90 This creates 
a significant incentive to develop sooner, rather than later.91 One con-
sequence is premature development. The regulatory risk can affect the 
density of development in addition to the timing.92 Habitat conserva-
tion under d1e ESA is the most obvious example of this phenomenon, 
but the same principles should apply in other conservation contexts 
where regulatory measures restrict the use and development of land 
containing ecologically valuable characteristics. The value of compensa-
tion is that it reduces the incentives to develop prematurely so as to re-
duce the risk of being regulated.93 
Economist Robert Innes argues d1at "it is not compensation per se 
that is necessary for the achievement of efficient development incen-
tives but rather the 'equal treatment' of developed and undeveloped 
property owners. "94 In the environmental conservation context, how-
ever, d1ere is no "equal treatment." Land use regulations are invariably 
focused on undeveloped, as opposed to developed, parcels, resulting in 
inefficient levels of development.95 
One argument against compensation is that it may create a "moral 
hazard" for landowners.96 If landowners know they will be compensated 
9D Turnbull, supra note 7, at 369. 
91 ld. at 370 ("The regulatory threat increases the riskiness of the investment returns 
from waiting to build on the land."). 
92 See id. at 392 ("While poorly defined or defended property rights in general lead to 
a slower pace of development in an economy, the threat of land use regulation generally 
creates incentives for more rapid development than would otherwise be observed in the 
market."); see also Robert Innes et al., Ihkings, Compensation, and Endangered Species Protection 
on P1ivate Lands, 12]. EcoN. PERSP. 35, 39 (1998); Robert Innes, Takings, Compensation, and 
Equal Treatment for Ownm of Developed and Undeveloped Property, 40 J.L. & EcoN. 403, 429 
(1997) [hereinafter Innes, Equal Treatment] ("[T]he possibility of uncompensated takings 
gives landowners an incentive to develop their property early on in order to reduce the 
risk that it will later be appmpriated for public use."). 
93 Innes et al., supra note 92, at 40 ("Compensation for a taking can restore efficient 
development incentives by reducing the 'use it or (maybe) lose it' motivation for overin-
vestment."): 
91 Innes, Equal Treatment, supm note 92, at 406. 
95 Land need not be in a "natural" or unmodified state to be subject to regulation, 
however. Environmental land use controls extend to human enhanced, restored, or cre-
ated habitats, wetlands, and the like. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 
359-60 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring a section 404 permit for the alteration of an artificially 
created seasonal wetland formerly used for salt manufacturing). 
96 See WILLIAM FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAw, EcoNOMICS, AND POLITICS 158-
59 (1995); see also Lawrence E. Blume et al., The Taking of Land: HI/zen Should Compensation 
Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 71, 81-86 (1984). As Fischel notes, even in the traditional eminent 
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for any eventual taking of their land, they will discount the risk of a tak-
ing, and therefore will be more likely to invest in improvements to their 
land that could be taken for public use.97 This may cause landowners to 
overinvest in improvements to their land. The threat of ove1investment 
in development from the moral hazard created by a compensation rule, 
however, appears to be small in comparison to the inefficiencies and 
costs ofunder-compensation.98 
More importantly, the moral hazard problem that may exist in 
other contexts is absent where land use regulations seek to preserve 
land in an undeveloped condition.99 In the environmental context, it 
is the threat of an uncompensated taking, not the potential for com-
pensation, that will induce landowners to overinvest in development 
of their lands_Ioo This is because it is the undeveloped nature of the 
land, and its value as wetlands, species habitat, or something else, that 
prompts the government regulation in the first place.lD1 
Unlike in tl1e standard eminent domain context, where environ-
mental preservation is at issue, once land is developed the threat of 
domain context, the existence of a moral hazard problem is dependent upon the nature of 
the underlying property rights in question. FISCHEL, supra, at 162. 
97 See Blume et al., supra note 96, at 81-86. This argument presumes that compensa-
tion for a taking makes the landowner whole, such that the landowner would be indiffer-
ent to whether or not the land is taken. This assumption is highly suspect in the eminent 
domain context, as those landowners for whom the amount of compensation is equal to 
the value of the land to them would be likely to agree to a voluntary sale of the property. 
vVhere the government is forced to resort to eminent domain, and there is no evidence 
that landowners are engaging in opportunistic behavior, the lack of agreement on a sale 
price is evidence that the landowner places a higher subjective value on the land in ques-
tion than does the marketplace, and therefore compensation does not make the land-
owner whole. 
There are also reasons why the use of eminent domain might have negative environ-
mental consequences. See generalZv Somin & Adler, sujJra note 19 (arguing that there is a 
strong environmental rationale for strictly limiting or prohibiting the use of eminent do-
main for economic development). · 
9B See William A. Fischel, Public Goods and PropeTty Rights: Of Coase, Tiebout, and just Com-
pensation, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: CooPERATJON, CoNFLICT & LAw 343, 354 (Terry L. Ander-
son & Fred S. McChesney eels., 2003). 
99 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and In-
centives, 49 STAN. L. REv. 305, 352 (1997). 
1oo See Robert Innes, The Economics of Takings and Compensation H'hen Land and Its Public 
Use Value Are in Private Hands, 76 LAND EcoN. 195, 206 (2000) ("If the government takes 
private land without compensation, landowners have a compelling incentive to overinvest 
in public-value-depleting measures that reduce the government's interest in the land and 
thereby reduce the landowner's risk of a taking."). 
1o1 See Thompson, supra note 99, at 352. 
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regulation drops significantly.102 As Professor David Dana notes, "inves-
tors have available to them an alternative to reducing their level of in-
vestment in response to tl1e risk of future natural preservation regula-
tion: they can accelerate their investments and, in essence, beat the 
regulatory clock. "103 Indeed, the surest way for a landowner to avoid 
regulation under the ESA is to ensure that her land does not constitute 
suitable habitat for a listed endangered species. 104 Similarly, once a wet-
land has been drained and no longer exhibits wetland characteristics, it 
is no longer subject to CWA permitting requirements.l05 Such preemp-
tive land modification is economically inefficient, socially wasteful, and 
potentially environmentally devastating. 106 Under current law, it is per-
fectly legal for a landowner to take preventive action to make conserva-
tion of her land less desirable.l07 For tl1is reason, the problem of pre-
emptive action cannot be addressed by increasing enforcement levels 
or penalties under the relevant statutes.10B 
102 Turnbull, supm note 7, at 369 ("Once a particular tract of land is developed, the ir-
reversibility of land improvements erases any remaining threat of this kind of regulation 
for the tract."). 
103 Dana, supra note 57, at 681. 
104 Gardner M. Brown, Jr. & Jason F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species Act, 12 
J. EcoN. PERSP. 3, 7 (1998) ("Since owning land which is hospitable to endangered species 
can dramatically circumscribe any development plans for that land, owners have an incen-
tive to destroy the habitat before listing occurs, sometimes known as the 'shoot, shovel, 
and shut-up' strategy."); see also Morrow, supra note 3, at 192 (describing the "shoot, shovel, 
and shut up" phenomenon). 
105 The CWA prohibits the "discharge" of a "pollutant" into navigable waters of the 
United States without a permit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000). Although "pollutant" is de-
fined quite broadly, see 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(6) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007), the Act does not 
prohibit draining or dredging wetlands. 
1°6 Thompson, supra note 99, at 351 (explaining that preventative destruction of habi-
tat and other ecological services "threaten[s] the continued existence of the ve1·y species 
that the ESA is designed to protect"). 
107 See Thompson, supm note 99, at 351 (noting that under the ESA, "[n]othing pre-
vents a property owner from destroying habitat prior to the listing of a species, and noth-
ing 1·equires a property owner to allow his land to become viable habitat after listing."). 
Similarly, the plain language of the CWA only prohibits the deposit of dredged or fill ma-
terial into jurisdictional wetlands, but does not explicitly prohibit other activities, such as 
draining, that may reduce wetland values. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344; Nat'! Mining Ass'n v U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1401-02, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (vacating a regula-
tion that required CWA section 404 permits for "incidental fallback," a side-effect of drain-
ing); Save Our Cmty. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 971 F.2d 1155, 1164-65 (Stl1 Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that the draining of a wetland alone does not require a permit under section 404 of 
the CWA). 
108 Some object to the perverse incentive argument on the grounds tl1at it condones, 
or accepts, law breaking, and that increased prosecution and heightened penalties might 
address the problem. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 31, at 21. This objection is inapposite, 
however, as landowners can still destroy the ecological values of their lands before they be-
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The economic effects of uncompensated land use regulation are 
not confined to those land parcels that are actually regulated.109 The 
prospect of additional regulation on other lands has economic effects 
as well. As Professor Geoffrey Turnbull explains, "the threat of regula-
tion itself alters private property rights by restricting landowners' per-
ceived options. "110 Although development permits may be available, 
landowners and investors cannot know beforehand whether their per-
mit applications will be gran ted. 111 Indeed, there is little assurance that 
they will even receive a formal approval or n;jection within a definite 
time period.112 By threatening to limit available land uses, such regula-
tions make landowner rights in such lands less secure. A lack of secure 
property rights increases the incentive to deplete land's value and 
shortens landowners' time horizons. 113 Where property rights are less 
secure, owners are also less likely to invest in improving or protecting a 
resource, and are more likely to consume it as quickly as possible. 114 
B. An Arm;' of Anecdotes 
Anecdotal accounts of private landowners induced to take "anti-
environmental" action in response to environmental land use regula-
tions are legion.115 Most, but not all, of these anecdotes concern the 
ESA. Because of the way the ESA works, many landowners have no in-
come subject to regulatory requirements. As J.B. Ruhl observes, "[T]here will always be 
some point before which the regulation does not apply and thus when landowners will be 
free to destroy a species' habitat." Ruhl, supra note 65, at 47. 
109 Turnbull, suj;ra note 7, at 365 ("Because land use regulation alters investment in-
centives for both regulated and for unregulated propeny, the unintended consequence of a 
regulation that is intended to improve social well-being may be to reduce it."). 
110 Jd. at 367; see a./so id. at 366--67 ("The t1!1·ea.t of regulation, whether or not the taking 
actually occurs, introduces uncertainty into property rights, and as a consequence, alters 
investment incentives."). 
111 ld. at 368. 
112 See id. ("[The] ESA creates a degree of uncertainty over possible development re-
strictions that might arise in the indefinite future."). · 
113 As Anthony Scott observes, "No one will take the trouble to husband and maintain 
a resource unless he has a reasonable certainty of receiving some portion of the product of 
his management; that is, unless he has some property right in the yield." Anthony Scott, 
The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63]. PoL. EcoN. 116, 116 (1955). Although it 
may be an overstatement to claim that "no one" will act in such a manner, the marginal 
effect should be indisputable. See id. 
11 4 For the classic analysis, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SciENCE 
1243, 1244 (1968); see a/soYORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 7-9, 
100 (2d ed. 1997). 
115 Polasky & Doremus, supra note 6, at 42 ("[S] tories of property owners who 'shoot, 
shovel, and shut up' are rampant."). 
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centive to make their lands more suitable for imperiled species.116 
Worse, the ESA creates an incentive for some landowners to consider 
managing their land so as to prevent such species from using it. 117 The 
National Association of Home Builders advised its members that "the 
highest level of assurance that a property owner will not face an ESA 
issue is to maintain the property in a condition such that protected 
species cannot occupy the property. "llB Wdting in Conservation Biology, a 
group of wildlife biologists observed that "the regulatory approach to 
conserving endangered species and diminishing habitats has created 
anti-conservation sentiment among many pdvate landowners who view 
endangered species as economic liabilities. "ll9 As a consequence of 
these negative incentives there is less and lower-quality available habitat 
for endangered species. 12° 
Among the most infamous episodes involving the perverse incen-
tives created by the ESA involved North Carolina landowner Ben 
Cone_l21 Cone owned over 7000 acres of timberland in North Caro-
llfi Michael J. Bean, Overcoming Unintended Consequences of Endangered Species Regulation, 
38 IDAHO L. REv. 409, 414 (2002). Bean notes, 'This is not a new observation." !d. 
ll7 !d. at 415. 
llB Michael J. Bean, The Endangered Species Act and Private Land: Four Lessons Learned 
hom the Past Qum·ter Cent·ury, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,701, 10,706 (1998) 
(quoting NAT'L Ass'N OF HOME BUILDERS, DEVELOPER'S GUIDE TO ENDANGERED SPECIES 
REGULATION 109 (1996)). 
ll9 Martin B. Main et al., Evaluating Costs of Conservation, 13 CoNSERVATION BIOLOGY 
1262, 1263 (1999). The authors further explain: 
Landowners fear a decline in value of their properties because the ESA re-
stricts future land -use options where threatened or endangered species are 
found but makes no provisions for compensation. Consequently, endangered 
species are perceived by many landowners as a financial liability, resulting in 
anticonservation incentives because maintaining high-quality habitats that 
harbor or attract endangered species would represent a gamble against loss of 
futm·e opportunities. 
Id. at 1265. 
120 Bean, supra note 116, at 415. 
121 The Cone story is regularly recounted to illustrate the potential impacts of the eco-
nomic incentives created by the ESA. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, A Garne-Theomtic Approach to 
Regulatory Negotiation and a Framework for Empirical Analysis, 26 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 33, 59 
(2002); Innes, supra note 100, at 195; Christian Langpap, Conservation Incentive Programs for 
Endangered Species: An Analysis of Landowner Participation, 80 LAND EcoN. 375, 375 (2004); 
Richard L. Stroup, The Economics of Compensating Property Owners, 15 CONTEMP. EcoN. PoL'Y 
55, 57-58 (1997); see also Holly Price, Red Cockaded Woodpecher; Pender Man Suing over Bird 
Habitat; Compensation Sought for Trees He Can't Cut, WILMINGTON STAR-NEws, July 22, 1995, 
at 4A; Ike C. Sugg, Editorial, The Timber Summit: Ecosystem Babbitt-Babble, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 
1993, at AlD. One reason t!1e Cone story received significant attention was because his 
plight was brought to the attention of Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt by then-Senator 
Lauch Faicloth (R-NC). This account is based on Lee Ann Welch, Property Rights Conflicts 
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lina_l22 Given his interest in wildlife, Cone devoted substantial efforts to 
improving the quality of species habitat on his land, maintaining long 
timber rotation cycles and engaging in selective logging and understory 
management.l23 His efforts proved successful, as populations of many 
species increased on his land, including wild turkey, quail, black bear, 
and deer.124 But Cone's good deeds would not go unpunished. 
Among the species that benefited from Cone's careful stewardship 
was the red-cockaded woodpecker (the "RCW"), a species listed as en-
dangered under the ESA.I25 In order to preserve the habitat that Cone 
had helped create, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the "FWS") placed 
over 1000 acres of his land off limits to logging.l 26 As a consequence, 
the value of Cone's land plummeted, costing him an estimated $2 mil-
lion.127 Cone learned his lesson: if he wanted to be able to make pro-
ductive use of his land, he should not manage it in a way that attracts 
RCWs. As he commented at the time, "I cannot afford to let those 
woodpeckers take over the rest of the property .... I'm going to start 
massive clearcutting .... "128 So Cone accelerated his timber rotations 
and began to clear other portions of his land to prevent further wood-
pecker infestations on his property.I29 
Regrettably, the story of Ben Cone is anything but an isolated in-
cident.130 Consider a handful more of the many anecdotal accounts of 
the ESA's perverse incentives in action: 
• In Kern County, California, landowners regularly clisced their 
lands to prevent the regrowth of endangered species habitat. 131 As 
one landowner explained, "Because of the Endangered Species 
Act we disc everything all the time. We are afraid of an endangered 
Under the Endangered Species Act: Protection of the Red-Cockaded Woodpecher, in LAND RIGHTS: 
THE 1990s' PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION, supra note 65, at 151, 173-85. 
122 Welch, supra note 121, at 173. 
123 !d. at 173-75. 
124 Id. at 173. 
125 Jd. at 174. 
126 Jd. 
127 Welch, supra note 121, at 175. 
12s Sugg, supra note 121. 
129 Welch, supra note 121, at 174--75. The publicity surrounding the Cone case eventu-
ally resulted in the FWS granting Cone an incidental taking permit allowing him to take all 
of the woodpeckers on his property. See 61 Fed. Reg. 36,390 (July 10, 1996); 62 Fed. Reg. 
54,122 (Oct. 17, 1997); see also Marianne Lavelle, Feds Settle to Save Act and Species but Critics 
Say Deals May HuTt Not Help Endangered, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 16, 1996, at AI. 
13° See infra notes 131-139 and accompanying text. 
131 David Parrish, Environmental Dilemma, L.A. DAILY NEws, Mar. 19, 1995, at 10. 
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species moving in. . . . [Discing] cost[s] $25 per acre. It's not 
cheap. But the risk of not doing it is too great. "132 
11 In the Pacific Northwest, the FWS found that land use restrictions 
imposed to protect d1e northern spotted owl scared private land~ 
owners enough that they "accelerated harvest rotations in an ef-
fort to avoid the regrowth of habitat that is usable by owls. "l33 
11 In Texas Hill Country, landowners razed hundreds of acres of ju-
niper tree stands after the golden-cheeked warbler was listed as an 
endangered species, to prevent the trees' occupation.l34 
11 In Boiling Springs Lakes, North Carolina, landowners began clear-
ing timber from their property while the FWS drew up maps of 
RCW nests, fearing more land would be placed off limits to log-
ging or development. 135 As the Mayor Joan Kinney explained, 
"People are just afraid a bird might fly in and make a nest and 
their property is worth nothing .... It is causing a tremendous 
amount of clear-cutting. "136 In just eight months, the city issued 
368 logging permits, even though few landowners sought building 
permits.137 
• Farmers in northern Sacramento County, California, have shifted 
from growing rice to other crops, partly due to fears their land 
could be regulated as garter snake habitat. 13B 
11 When the FWS proposed listing the San Diego Mesa Mint as en-
dangered, land containing the plant was bulldozed before the list-
ing could take effect.I39 
132 Id. Similarly, in California's Central Valley, farmers plow fallow fields to destroy po-
tential habitat and prevent the growth of vegetation that could attract endangered species. 
Jennifer Warren, Revised Species Protection Law Eases Farmers' Anxiety, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 
1997, atAl. 
133 60 Fed. Reg. 9507-08 (Feb. 17, 1995); see also Bean, supra note ll8, at 10,706 (de-
scribing the same phenomenon). 
134 See jAMES V. DELONG, PROPERTY MATTERS 103 (1997); David Wright, Death to Tweety, 
NEW REPUBLIC, July 6, 1992, at 9-10. Among those landowners who engaged in preemp-
tive habitat destruction was H. Ross Perot. Wright, supra, at 8-9. 
135 Wade Rawlins, Woodpecker iVIapping Gets Chain Saws Buzzing, NEws & OBSERVER (Ra-
leigh, N.C.), Aug. 7, 2006, at Al. 
136 Id. 
137 Rare Woodpedu;r Sends a Town Running for Its Chain Saws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, 
at 30. In an ironic twist, the primary reason the small town was so attractive to red-
cockaded woodpeckers in the first place was because tree notches left from local turpen-
tine production made the pines better potential nesting sites. Id. 
138 Mary Lynne Vellinga, Owners Tum Off Spigot on Rice Fields, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 
14, 2007, at A1, available at http:/ /www.sacbee.com/101/story/323680.html. 
139 See CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH's CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF EN-
DANGERED SPECIES 187 (1995); Charles C. Mann & Mark Plummer, Is Endangered Species Act 
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Some environmental activist groups have sought to discount or 
refute anecdotal accounts of the ESA's perverse incentives and their 
implications for successful species conservation.140 In the early 1990s, 
as these sorts of stories first began to receive attention, major envi-
ronmentalist groups were touting the ESA as a success, claiming it has 
saved species "without frequent conflict of a draconian nature. "141 The 
Endangered Species Coalition, an umbrella organization representing 
environmental groups focused on ESA reform, sought to strengthen 
the ESA by stiffening enforcement, increasing penalties and "closing 
the legal loopholes," all the while denying that the Act had any sig-
nificant impact on private landowners. 142 A lawyer with the National 
Wildlife Federation even maintained that the ESA "has never pre-
vented property owners from developing their land. "143 
Nevertheless, as anecdotal evidence of the ESA's anti-environ-
mental incentives mounted, and the status of species dependent on 
private land failed to improve, some environmental leaders took notice. 
Among them was wildlife law expert Michael Bean of Environmental 
Defense. In a 1994 speech to FWS personnel, Bean acknowledged the 
following: 
[There is] increasing evidence that at least some private land-
owners are actively managing their land so as to avoid poten-
tial endangered species problems. The problems they're try-
ing to avoid are the problems stemming from the Act's 
prohibition against people taking endangered species by ad-
verse modification of habitat. And they're trying to avoid 
in Danger?, 267 SciENCE 1256, 1258 ( 1995); Holmes Rolston III, Pmperty Rights and Endan-
gered SjJecies, 61 U. CoLo. L. REv. 283, 283-,.84 (1990). Even though endangered plants are 
not subject to the same level of regulatory protection as endangered animals, the presence 
of an endangered plant can prevent the issuance of a federally required permit. See 16 
U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (2000) (limiting the "take" pmhibition to "endangered species of fish 
or wildlife"); id. § 1538(a) (2) (B), (E) (extending certain other prohibitions to endan-
gered plants). 
140 See, e.g., Echeverria, sujJra note 31, at 22 ("[T]he allegedly perverse enYironmental 
costs of the regulatory approach are probably overstated by regulation's critics."). 
J.IJ Michael J. Bean, Taking Stock: The Endangered Species Act in the Eye of a Growing Stann, 
13 PuB. LAND L. REv. 77, 86 (1992) (Bean is a senior attorney and Chairman of the Wild-
life Program at Environmental Defense). 
142 JoNATHAN H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: GREEN ACTIVISM IN 
AMERICA 18-19 (1995) (summarizing the Endangered Species Coalition's 1994 "action 
agenda"). 
113 John Kost:yack, Letter to the Editor, If Ecosystem Is Hmmed, We'1·e All Endangered, 
WALL ST.]., May 12, 1994, atA15. 
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those problems by avoiding having endangered species on 
their property. 144 
As Bean recounted, the incentives of the ESAcreated a race to clear po-
tential habitat before the FWS would impose additional requirements. 145 
Bean observed that landowners could take a number of different 
steps to avoid "endangered species problems."146 In the case of the 
RCW, these included "deliberately harvesting their trees before they 
reach sufficient age to attract woodpeckers," even if this meant cutting 
trees "before they reach the optimum age from an economic point of 
view."147 Landowners could further make their lands less attractive to 
RCWs "simply by refraining from understory management," or replant-
ing alternate tree species. 148 Although Bean characterized these effects 
as "surprising" in a subsequent article,149 in 1994, he explained land-
owner responses were "fairly rational decisions motivated by a desire to 
avoid potentially significant economic constraints" and "nothing more 
-than a predictable response to· the familiar perverse incentives that 
sometimes accompany regulatory programs. "150 
The threat of regulation can affect the willingness of landowners 
to participate in voluntary conservation agreements.151 Bob Stallman of 
the Texas Farm Bureau testified in 1995, before a congressional task 
force on wetlands and endangered species, that so long as the existing 
regulatory strictures remain in place, his members "are not going to 
want to work actively and openly to promote or propagate a species as 
long as there is tl1at threat of future government intervention and 
regulation of the use of that land. "152 As Michael Bean observes, the 
144 Michael Bean, Chair, Envtl. Def. Fund Wildlife Program, Remarks at the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service Office of Training and Education Seminar Series: Ecosystem Ap-
proaches to Fish and Wildlife Conservation: "Rediscovering the Land Ethic" 5 (Nov. 3, 
1994) (transcript on file witl1 author). 
!45 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
HB Id. 
H9 Bean, supm note 118, at 10,701. 
!5° Bean, supra note 144, at 6. 
151 Christian Langpap &JunJie Wu, Voluntary Conservation of Endangered Species: When Does 
No Regulatory Assurance Mean No Conservation?, 47]. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 435, 435 (2004). 
152 Heming Before the Task Force on Endangered Species and Task Force on Wetlands of the H. 
Resources Comrn., 1 04tl1 Con g. 91 ( 1995) (statement of Bob Stallman, President, Texas Farm 
Btu·eau). Similarly, Dayton Hyde, founder of Opet·ation Stronghold, a nonprofit conserva-
tion organization, attests from personal experience that, even for those who wish to engage in 
habitat conset-vation on tl1eir own land, "It's just plain easier and a lot safer to sterilize the 
]and." TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 72 (2d 
ed. 2001). 
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ESA's uncompensated land use controls result in "simple unwillingness 
to do the mundane management activities that could create or en-
hance habitat for rare species."153 This is a problem because, in many 
cases, the absence of harmful behavior may not be sufficient to con-
serve and recover endangered species.154 As the FWS has acknowl-
edged, the costs imposed by habitat modification restrictions "in some 
cases may actually generate disincentives for private landowner support 
for threatened species conservation. "155 
For the purposes of environmental conservation, the important 
question is whether the negative effects of environmental land use con-
trols are isolated or widespread. In 1993, Dr. Larry McKinney, Director 
of Resource Protection for the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, 
said he believed "more habitat for the black-capped vireo, and espe-
cially the golden-cheeked warbler, has been lost in those areas of Texas 
since the listing of these birds than would have been lost without the 
ESA at all. "156 Yet he also acknowledged that he lacked hard empirical 
evidence to substantiate this claim.157 In the past several years, however, 
researchers have undertaken more systematic analyses of the incentives 
created by uncompensated land use controls.l58 
C. Empirical Evidence of Habitat Loss 
At one time it was possible to discount the environmental critique 
of the ESA insofar as it was based upon anecdotal evidence.159 Although 
the perverse-incentive problem was acknowledged by many enVIron-
153 Bean, supm note 116, at 415. 
154 Langpap & Wu, supra note 151, at 436. 
155 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Rule Exempting 
Certain Small Landowners and Low-Impact Activities From Endangered Species Act Re-
quirements for Threatened Species, 60 Feel. Reg. 37,419, 37,420 (july 20, 1995). 
156 Larry McKinney, Reauthorizing the Endangered Species Act-Incentives for Ruml Land-
owners, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 71, 74 
(1993); see also Ruhl, su.jJm note 65, at 45-47 (discussing landowner efforts to avoid having 
land designated as habitat for the black-capped vireo). 
157 McKinney, supra note 156, at 74. 
158 See infra notes 164-197 and accompanying text. 
159 See Jeffrey]. Rachlinski, Protecting Endangered SjJecies Without Reguloting Private Land-
owners: The Case of Endangered Plants, 8 CoRNELLJ.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 1, 36 (1998) ("Other 
than anecdotes ... there is no evidence to support the conclusion that these [ESA] restric-
tions actually harm species."); see also Thompson, sujJm note 99, at 307 (explaining that 
discussions of the ESA suffer from a "data gap" that is "supplanted with raw assertions and 
anecdotes, many of which are embellished or apocryphal"); Daowei Zhang & Warren A. 
Flick, Sticks, Carmts, and Reforestation Investment, 77 LAND EcoN. 443, 445 (2001) ("The 
influence of the ESA on landowner investment behavior has been a subject of speculation 
and debate, but very little empirical study."). 
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mental researchers and wildlife conservationists, it was difficult to de-
termine whether such incentives had a meaningful impact on conserva-
tion efforts.lfiO The failure of the ESA to conserve species on private 
lands was certainly suggestive of a problem. 161 Nonetheless, there was 
little firm evidence tl1at uncompensated land use regulations were hav-
ing widespread negative environmental impacts.l62 Today, however, 
there is significant empirical support for the anecdotal and the-oretical 
claims that land use regulations harm species conservation efforts on 
private land as a result of the incentives created for private landown-
ers.l63 
The first study documenting tl1e negative environmental effects of 
uncompensated land use regulations, by economists Dean Lueck and 
Jeffrey Michael, examined the rate of preemptive habitat destruction by 
owners of private timberland at risk of federal regulation due to the 
presence of endangered RCWs. 164 Providing habitat for a single RCW 
colony can cost up to $200,000 in foregone timber harvests.l65 To avoid 
this result, those landowners at greatest risk of ESA-imposed restrictions 
· were most likely to harvest their forestlands prematurely and to reduce 
the length of tl1eir timber harvesting rotations, even at tl1e potential 
expense oflost timber income.l66 
Lueck and Michael found that "increases in the probability of ESA 
land-use restrictions, as measured by a landowner's proximity to exist-
ing RCW colonies, increase tl1e probability of forest harvest and de-
crease the age at which timber is harvested. "167 Because RCWs depend 
upon older trees for nesting cavities, cutting timber at a younger age 
deprives RCWs of potential habitat.l68 Lueck and Michael estimated 
that RCWs lost several thousand acres of habitat due to such effects, 
enough to provide habitat for between twenty-five and seventy-six RCW 
160 See Thompson, supm note 99, at 351 (stating that "[t]here is no reliable estimate" of 
the extent to which landowners have engaged in preemptive habitat modification). 
161 See infra notes 226--243 and accompanying text. 
162 See Rachlinski, supm note 159, at 36. 
163 See infra notes 164-197 and accompanying text. 
164 See generally Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Ha!Jitat Destruction Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. &. EcoN. 27 (2003). 
165 !d. at 33. The estimates cited by Lueck and Michael are based upon the mainte-
nance of minimum habitat requirements for a woodpecker colony. If land use restrictions 
are designed to provide greater protection of woodpecker habitat, the costs would be 
greater. See id. at 33 n.27. 
166 !d. at 51-52. 
167 !d. at 31. 
168 !d. at 32. 
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colonies, in the state of North Carolina alone. 169 Given that ESA restric-
tions only protected eighty-four woodpecker colonies on plivate land at 
the time of the Lueck and Michael study, their findings are quite sig-
nifican t. 170 
A second study on RCW habitat by Daowei Zhang confirmed the 
Lueck and Michael findings.m Zhang found that "regulatory uncer-
tainty and lack of positive economic incentives alter landowner timber 
harvesting beha,~or and hinder endangered species conservation on 
private lands."172 Absent the regulatory uncertainty created by the ESA, 
"landowners choose among harvesting methods to maximize stumpage 
revenue ... subject to constraints such as forest stand characteristics 
... , aesthetics, management objective, and tax liability."173 The threat 
of regulatory prohibitions on timber activity, however, alters the land-
owners' calculation. Zhang found that "a landowner is 25% more likely 
to cut forests when he or she knows or perceives that a RCW cluster is 
within a mile of the land than otherwise. "174 The threat of ESA regula-
tion also increased the likelihood that a landowner would engage in 
dear-cutting when harvesting the timber, as opposed to a selective har-
vesting technique that may have less severe ecological impacts. 175 On 
this basis Zhang concluded that "at least for the RCW, the ESA has a 
strong negative effect on habitat," and this effect appears to be "sub-
stantial. "176 
The Zhang study, like the Lueck and Michael study, confirmed the 
anecdotal observations made by Bean and others: 
Despite the use of different data, the basic conclusions reached 
in these two studies are similar: the ESA regulations actually 
lead landowners [to] cut their timber sooner, to the detJiment 
of the RCW, than they otherwise would do. As a consequence, 
RCW habitats have been reduced on private lands because of 
169 Lueck & Michael, supra note 164, at 53-54. 
11o Id. at 54. Lueck and Michael also note that "our study can also be seen as an under-
estimate of the total perverse impacts since we consider only preemptive timber harvesting 
and do not measure direct harm to RCVVs or more indirect, passive approaches to reduc-
ing habitat." !d. at 55. 
171 See Daowei Zhang, Endangered Sj;ecies and Timber Harvesting: The Case of Red-Codwded 
vVoodj;echers, 42 EcoN. INQUIRY 150, 150 (2004). 
172 !d. at 151. 
173 !d. at 155. 
174 !d. at 160. 
175 !d. at 161. 
176 Zhang, supra note 171, at 162. 
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the ESA. In this case the ESA imposes costs but does not gener-
ate conservation benefits_l77 
These findings are further supported by data showing that the rate 
and magnitude of reforestation investment is reduced due to the risk 
of land use regulation, such as that imposed under the ESA, l7B and 
that government incentive programs may alleviate the magnitude of 
these negative incentives_l79 
A study of landowner responses to the listing of d1e endangered 
Preble's meadow jumping mouse in Conservation Biology provides still 
more empirical evidence that the ESA discourages private landowner 
cooperation with federal conservation efforts.180 Amara Brook, Michaela 
Zint, and Raymond De Young surveyed owners of jumping mouse habi-
tat and found that a significant number of landowners took actions to 
make their lands less hospitable to the mouse once it was listed as en-
dangered.181 Although some landowners sought to improve the quality 
of the habitat on their land, the data suggested that "the efforts of 
landowners who acted to help the Preble's were cancelled by those who 
sought to harm it."182 This led the authors to conclude that "[t]he cur-
rent regulatory approach to the conservation of rare species is insuffi-
cient to protect the Preble's mouse."183 Particularly troublesome was 
their conclusion that "[a]s more landowners become aware that their 
land contains Preble's habitat, it is likely that the impact on the species 
may be negative. "184 
The Brook, Zint, and De Young study further illustrates that the 
imposition of land use regulations can have a negative environmental 
effect. 185 Those landowners who undertook conservation activities did 
177 Id. 
178 Zhang & Flick, supra note 159, at 454 ("[L)andowners will reforest more slowly and 
invest less if they perceive that their lands will be subject to the ESA or any other similar 
regulations, and they will be more likely to reforest quickly and invest more if government 
financial assistance programs are available."). 
179 Id. ('This study shows that government financial assistance programs can be used to 
alleviate the disincentive provided by the ESA in refo,·estation investment."). 
180 Almira Bmok, Michaela Zint & Raymond De \oung, Landowners' Responses to an En-
dangered Species A.ct Listing and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17 CONSERVATION 
BIOLOGY 1638, 1638 (2003). 
181 Id. at 1643. 
182 Jd. 
183 Id. at 1644. 
184 Jd. 
185 Brook, Zint & De Young, supra note 180, at 1643, 1647. The authors note that their 
research may have underestimated the negative actions of landowners due to selection 
bias. In particular, the authors note that "nonrespondents may have been more worried 
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so in response to the species' listing. Given their support for environ-
mental stewardship or other landowners, these landowners responded 
positively to the information that their land was important to an en-
dangered species.l86 Unless one believes that there is widespread vis-
ceral hostility to endangered species, as such, those who took negative 
actions presumably did so due to the threat of regulation, and its eco-
nomic consequences,1B7 and not because of any animus toward Preble's 
meadow jumping mice.IBB 
A fourth recent study of uncompensated ESA regulation sought to 
measure "the extent to which landowners act to preempt regulation 
dming the urban growth process" by accelerating the rate at which land 
is developed. 189 Economists John List, Michael Margolis, and Daniel 
Osgood focused on landowner responses to the threat of regulation of 
habitat for the cactus ferruginous pygmy owl near Tucson, Arizona, 
finding further evidence that ESA regulation accelerates the rate at 
which privately owned species habitat is developed. 190 Specifically, List, 
Margolis, and Osgood found that land designated as critical pygmy owl 
habitat was, on average, developed one year earlier than equivalent 
parcels that were not designated as habitat. 191 This acceleration of de-
velopment was facilitated, in part, because the pygmy owl was listed, 
and proposed critical habitat was published, months before regulatory 
responses were imposed, "allowing landowners ample time to re-
and fearful that participation, even though it was anonymous, could have negative conse-
quences." !d. at 1642. 
186 See id. at 1639 (citing research showing that "information from sources with a con-
servation focus (e.g. wildlife agencies) has encouraged land conservation" and noting that 
landowners' individual values affect their land use practices and willingness to engage in 
conservation activities). 
187 !d. at 1647 (noting negative actions prompted by "economic concerns of agricul-
tural landowners"); see also Morrow, supra note 3, at 227-30 (suggesting "rural anti-
environmentalism" is a response to the imposition of land use regulations). 
188 As the experience of Ben Cone illustrates, some landowners would view species 
habitat as an asset were it not for the costs imposed by federal regulation. See infra notes 
121-129 and accompanying text. But see Brook, Zint & De Young, supra note 180, at 1644 
("Because mice tend to be perceived as a nuisance ... results may be different for species 
that are better liked."). 
189 John A. List, Michael Margolis & Daniel E. Osgood, Is the Endangered Sjm:i.es Act En-
dangering Species? 1-2 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12777, 2006), 
available at http:/ /www.nber.org/papers/w 12777. 
190 !d. at 2. 
191 !d. As with the other studies, the authors found some reasons why their analysis 
could underestimate the anticonservation incentives produced by ESA regulation. See id. at 
16 n.15 (noting that some owners of owl habitat may have anticipated the subsequent in-
validation of the critical habitat designation in federal court). 
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spond. "192 The findings of the pygmy owl study are reinforced by addi-
tional data showing that the value of undeveloped land designated as 
critical habitat fell relative to other land in the study area. 193 
One potential criticism of the List, Margolis, and Osgood analysis 
is that it overstates the importance of critical habitat designations. Land 
modifications that could alter or destroy habitat, and thereby "harm" a 
listed species, are prohibited under section 9 regardless of whether a 
given parcel is designated "critical habitat."194 Habitat designations 
nonetheless provide information about the likelihood of a given land 
parcel's being regulated.l95 So when a critical habitat designation is 
proposed and published in the Federal Register, it could well induce 
landowners to take preemptive action. 196 · 
Although List, Margolis, and Osgood focused on the timing of de-
velopment, it should be noted that government actions that encourage 
more rapid development can be expected to result in more develop-
mentoverall. For ecological purposes, the decision to develop land is 
largely irreversible.197 Land that is not developed today can still be con-
served or protected before it is developed tomorrow. Thus prevent-
ing-or, at least, avoiding creating incentives for-premature develop-
ment is important to the ultimate goal of ecological conservation. 
Most of the available evidence on the perverse incentives created 
by uncompensated land use restrictions focuses on the ESA. 198 This 
does not mean that other environmental regulations that limit or 
prohibit the development or productive use of ecologically valuable 
land do not induce the same sort of effects. For example, when North 
Carolina regulators proposed more stringent wetland drainage regu-
lations in 1999, the rate of wetland drainage and development on pri-
vate land increased dramatically, as landowners sought to act before 
the new rules came into effect. 199 In other cases, landowners have 
192 ld. at 16. 
193 ld. at 25. 
194 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19); 1538 (2000). 
195 See id. § 1533(a) (3), (b) (6), (b) (8) (2000 & Supp. IV. 2004). 
196 Seeid. § 1533(b)(6). 
197 See Tum bull, supra note 7, at 369 (noting the irreversibility of improvements that 
impair or destroy habitat). This is not to deny the potential for ecological restoration, or 
the potential to recover developed lands within an ecological time frame. The point is that 
if a threatened species relies on a given land area, development effectively removes that 
land from the species' potential habitat. Further, as is often noted, extinction is forever. 
198 See supra notes 164-197 and accompanying text. 
199 See Lueck & Michael, supra note 164, at 51. 
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sought to develop wetlands on private land before they are discovered 
by federal regulators.2oo 
For years the federal government has sought to prevent landown-
ers from taking actions to destroy, or facilitate the elimination of, wet-
land characteristics on private land so as to evade the permitting re-
quirements under section 404 of the CWA. The so-called "Tulloch 
Rule," for example, prohibited the draining of wetlands so as to allow 
for their subsequent development. 201 The adoption of this regulation, 
and efforts to maintain the prohibition after tl1e regulation was struck 
down in federal court, is evidence that federal regulators believe land-
owners will take actions to avoid the costs of federal wetlands regula-
tions. 
It is possible that wetlands conservation measures under section 
404 may not produce the same level of preemptive destruction.2o2 It is 
quite likely, however, that section 404 can discourage the voluntary 
creation and restoration of wetlands on private land much as tl1e ESA 
discourages private creation and maintenance of species habitat.2°3 
Federal wetland regulations apply equally to human-created and natu-
rally formed wetlands. Private landowners have faced prosecution for 
altering artificially created wetlands without federal permits.204 As a 
consequence, there is no reason why federal wetland regulations would 
not discourage wetland creation and restoration on private land in 
200 John Rapanos, for example, sought to destroy federally regulated wetlands without 
the knowledge offederal regulators. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2238-39 
(2006) (Kennedy,]., concurring in the judgment)~ 
2°1 See Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,016, 45,035 (Aug. 
25, 1993) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2) (adopting the 'Tulloch 
Rule"). The rule was subsequently invalidated in federal court. See National Mining Ass'n, 145 
F. 3d at 1410. The Army Corps responded with a new 'Tulloch Rule." See Further Revisions to 
the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 
4550, 4575 (Jan. 17, 2001) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2). This 
rule was also invalidated in federal court. See Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng'rs, No. 01-0274, 2007 vVL 259944, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2007), apjJeal dismissed sub 
nom. Nat'! Ass'n of Homebuilders v. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n, No. 07-5111, 2007 WL 1549109, at 
*1 (D.C. Cir. May 25, 2007). 
202 Thompson, supra note 3, at 296. Thompson notes three key differences between 
wetlands regulations and the ESA: the absence of an equivalent listing process, more visi-
ble application of wetlands regulations, and higher costs associated with tl1e types of land 
modification activities required to preempt wetlands regulations as opposed to ESA regula-
tions. !d. 
2°3 See Bean, supra note 116, at.414 (noting tl1at under tlle ESA, landowners have "no in-
centive to do the things that would make their lands a better place for imperiled species"). 
204 See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1990) (re-
quiring a section 404 permit for tl1e alteration of an artificially created seasonal wetland 
formerly used for salt manufacturing). 
332 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 49:301 
much the same fashion as the ESA discourages habitat creation and 
maintenance on such lands. 2°5 Further, as noted below, the costs of fed-
eral wetland regulations certainly encourage political efforts to subvert 
or redirect regulatory efforts. 206 
D. Compromising Scientific Research 
The perverse, anti-environmental incentives of uncompensated 
environmental land use regulation are not limited to the provision and 
maintenance of ecological services. The threat of land use regulation 
under statutes like the ESA also discourages private landmvners from 
disclosing information and cooperating with scientific research o-n their 
land, further compromising species conservation efforts.2°7 As Profes-
sors Stephen Polasky and Holly Doremus observe, 'The current ESA 
... gives landowners little incentive to cooperate with information col-
lection activity. Under these conditions, botl1 information collection 
and species conservation on private lands are likely to occur at less than 
optimal levels. "2°8 Some landowners fear that the discovery of endan-
gered or threatened species populations will result in the imposition of 
land use controls.2°9 Whereas regulators need greater information 
about the status and location of endangered species and their habitat, 
property owners fear the disclosure of such information could lead to 
costly regulation.210 Perhaps as a consequence, most research on en-
dangered species occurs on government land, despite the importance 
of private land for species preservation.211 
205 Along the same lines, there is also evidence that historical preservation regulations, 
which impose similar types of land use restrictions, can also discourage voluntary preserva-
tion efforts. See William A. Fischel, Lead Us Not into Penn Station: Takings, Historic Preserva-
tion, and Rent Contml, 6 FoRDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 749, 754 (1995) (noting "landlords will begin 
hiring mediocre architects or asking good architects to design mediocre buildings that will 
not be landmarked"). 
2°6 See infra notes 306-336 and accompanying text. 
207 See infra notes 208-225 and accompanying text. 
208 Polasky & Doremus, supra note 6, at 41; see also Hilty & Merenlender, supra note 3, 
at 133. 
209 Hilty & Merenlender, supra note 3, at 136; see also Morrow, supra note 3, at 194 (not-
ing that even those ranchers who support endangered species conservation are reluctant 
to inform federal agencies about populations on their land). 
210 Polasky & Doremus, supra note 6, at 23 ("[U]nder current conservation rules, in-
formation is a prerequisite to regulation. Therefore, as a result, property owners and regu-
lators have sharply divergent views of the desirability of increased information about spe-
cies status and distribution."). 
2 ll See Hilty & !Vlerenlender, supra note 3, at 133. 
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Information about land's ecological characteristics is inherently 
decentralized, existing in the land itself until it is discovered, and re-
maining localized until it is collected and disuibuted. Furthermore, 
landowners have private information about habitat value that is un-
available to government regulators without landowner cooperation.212 
The current regulatory system, insofar as it relies upon uncompensated 
controls on private land use, gives landowners no incentive }o cooper-
ate with wildlife conservationists.213 To the contrary, as note1 by Profes-
sor Barton Thompson, current law gives landowners "an incentive to 
conceal information about endangered species that might lead to 
tighter regulation and to preclude government scientists and officials 
from surveying their property."214 Just as it discourages habitat conser-
vation on private land, ESA section 9 creates perverse incentives for 
landowners to suppress information about the presence of endangered 
species on their lands in order to avoid regulation. 215 One consequence 
is that current projections may underestimate the presence of endan-
gered species on private lands.216 
The lack of more complete data on endangered species and their 
habitat complicates species conservation efforts.217 In some cases, a pri-
vate landowner might be the only person who knows a listed species is 
on their land.218 This information asymmeu·y makes government ef-
212 Lueck & Michael, supra note 164, at 34; see also Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, In-
centives, Gifts, and Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of Private Land, in Cultural and 
Psychological Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 423, 432 ("Rural landowners may find it diffi-
cult to monitor their property, but they have it easier than the federal government."); 
George F. Wilhere, Adaptive Management in Hamtat Conservation Plans, 16 CoNSERVATION 
BIOLOGY 20, 23 (2001). 
213 Jason F. Shogren et a!., vWzy Economics Matters for Endangered Species Protection, 13 
CoNSERVATION BIOLOGY 1257, 1260 (1999) ("On private land, the government needs 
landowner cooperation to gain the information necessary to administer conservation pol-
icy, yet landowners may have been able to escape regulation by hiding information from 
the government. If so, conservation policy may need to use the carrot of compensation 
rather than the stick of permits and fines to elicit information."). 
214 Barton H. Thompson Jr., Protecting Biodiversity Through Policy Diversity, 38 IDAHO L. 
REv. 355, 364 (2001). 
215 Robert Bonnie, Endangered Species 1\!Jitigation Banking: Promoting Recovery Through 
Habitat Conservation Planni11g Under the Endangered Species Act, 240 Sci. TOTAL ENv'T 11, 13 
(1999). 
216 See Wilcove & Lee, supra note 3, at 640 (noting likely underestimate due to "the re-
luctance of many private landowners to cooperate with surveys for endangered species"). 
217 See Jason F. Shogren eta!., The Role of Private Information in Designing Conservation In-
centives for Property Owners, in SPECIES AT RISK: USING EcONOMIC INCENTIVES TO SHELTER 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ON PRIVATE LANDS 217, 217 (Jason F. Shogren ed., 2005) (noting 
that "imperfect information" complicates conservation efforts). 
21a Id. 
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forts to conserve species on private land particularly difficult.219 In fact, 
as the species conservation value of a given parcel of land increases, so 
does the need for accurate information about its ecological condition. 
Therefore, the potential negative consequences of uncompensated 
land use controls may be the highest for land in the greatest need of 
protection. 220 
Brook, Zint, and De Young found evidence that such incentives 
are significant.22l Specifically, they found that most landowners would 
refuse to give biologists permission to conduct research on their land 
to assess endangeted mouse populations, out of fear that land use re-
strictions would follow the discovery of a mouse on their land: "Many 
landowners appeared to defend themselves against having their land-
management options restricted by refusing to allow surveys for the 
Preble's [mouse]. "222 Yet such data is essential to the development of 
effective species recovery plans.223 
Thus, the incentives against habitat conservation created by fed-
eral land use regulation are compounded by the incentives against al-
lowing scientific research on private land. Together, these incentives 
discourage private landowners from participating in conservation bank-
ing, biological surveys, and other efforts to facilitate private land con-
servation.224 Landowners "fear that investigating opportunities will re-
veal previously unrecognized endangered species and, in the event that 
a bank is not established, result in increased enforcement of the 
2l9 See Thompson, supra note 99, at 315; see also James Salzman, Creating Mar/lets for Eco-
system Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 870, 916 (2005) (noting information 
asymmetry between government regulators and private landowners). The difficulty of 
obtaining information from private landowners may be compounded by the FWS reluc-
tance to encourage public participation in the habitat conservation planning process. See 
Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive 
1\llanagement, 55 UCLA L. REv. 293, 317 (2007). 
220 See Shogren eta!., supra note 217, at 224. 
221 Brook, Zint & De Young, supra note 180, at 1644. 
222 Jd. 
223 Id. ('Without this information, formulating conservation plans is difficult, and 
those that are formed may be inaccurate, perceived as illegitimate, or challenged in the 
courts because of a lack of supporting data."). 
224 See Polasky & Doremus, supra note 6, at 28 ("Congress has regularly barred the use 
of federal funds to conduct biological surveys of private property without consent, even 
going so far as to prohibit federal funding on aerial surveys unless requested by the land-
owner."); see also DELONG, supra note 134, at 104 (noting how property rights concerns 
blocked legislative authorization of the National Biological Survey); Frederic H. Wagne1~ 
·whatever Happened to the National Biological Survey?, 49 BIOSCIENCE 219,220 (1999) (same). 
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ESA. "225 This discourages landowners from even investigating the pos-
sibility of participating in such conservation programs. 
E. Failing to Save Species 
The perverse incentives created by uncompensated land use regu-
lations may explain the ESA's poor record of conserving endangered 
and threatened species on private land.226 There is no debate that habi-
tat loss is the primary threat to endangered species.227 It is now widely 
acknowledged that the ESA's traditional approach to regulation, based 
on land use restrictions, has failed to attain the core objectives of spe-
cies conservation and recovery.228 The ESA was adopted in 1973, with 
broad bipartisan support.229 Since then, relatively few species listed as 
threatened or endangered have improved to the point of delisting.230 
Economists Joe Kirkvliet and Christian Langpap have noted, for exam-
ple, that the aim of species recovery "has been reached in distressingly 
few cases."231 Those species that have improved do not appear to have 
benefited much from the ESA's primary regulatory provisions.232 In-
deed it is possible that there is not a single endangered species that has 
had its condition improve on private land due to the ESA. 
If endangered species habitat is not preserved on private land, 
many endangered species will not survive. Ecologist David Wilcove ex-
plains, "[H]abitat destruction and degradation are by far the leading 
225 Jessica Fox & Anamaria Nino-Murcia, Status of Species Conservation Banhing in the 
United States, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 996, 1006 (2005). 
226 See infra notes 227-243 and accompanying text. 
227 David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to IrnjJeriled SjJecies in the United States, 48 
BIOSCIENCE 607, 607 (1998) (stating that "scientists agree that habitat destruction is the 
primary lethal agent"); id. at 609 (finding that habitat destruction and degradation con-
tributed to the endangerment of eighty-five percent of species analyzed). 
228 Langpap & Wu, supra note 151, at 436. 
229 See Pub. L. No. 93-205,87 Stat. 884-903 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1544 (2000 & Supp.IV 2004) ). 
230 See Robbyn J. F. Abbitt & J. Michael Scott, Examining Diff~ences Between Recovered and 
Declining Endangered Species, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1274, 1275 (2001); Robert E. 
Gordon, Jr. et al., Conservation Under the Endangered Species Act, 23 ENv'T lNT'L 359, 359 
(1997); Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man 
and Prospects for Reform, 24 CuMB. L. REv. 1, 42-44 ( 1993). 
231 Joe Kerkvliet & Christian Langpap, Learning from Endangered and Threatened Species 
Recovery Programs: A Case Study Using U.S. Endangered Species Act Recovery Scores, 63 EcoLOGI-
CAL ECON. 499,500 (2007). 
232 Sugg, supra note 230, at 42-44. It is worth noting that many of the alleged "suc-
cesses" of the ESA involve species that were either never in danger of extinction or were 
helped by exogenous factors. See id. (discussing the examples of the Palau dove, Palau 
fantail flycatcher, Palau owl, Rydberg milk-vetch, and American alligator). 
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threats to biodiversity, contributing to the endangerment of at least 
eighty-eight percent of the plants and animals on the endangered spe-
cies list. "233 Yet the ESA and other regulatory measures have not been 
particularly effective at preserving habitat on private land. 234 As docu-
mented above, one reason for this is that an environmental regulatory 
scheme that ignores landowners' responses to economic incentives is 
unlikely to achieve its goals.235 Moreover, even strong advocates of regu-
latory measures to protect endangered species habitat acknowledge 
that "[n] o one ... suggests that the federal ESA is realizing Congres-
sional intent or that it has been implemented rationally or responsi-
bly. "236 As noted biologist E.O. Wilson explained, private landowners 
are "deathly afraid of ... losing their personal property rights [due to 
environmental regulation] .... So the secret-and it's not a secret-lies 
in providing incentives for people whose property contains endangered 
species. "237 
There are many species that rely upon private land and are not ef-
fectively protected. According to Michael Bean, 'We have too many cases 
like [the red-cockaded woodpecker] , where a species is listed for years, 
but the population continues to go straight down the tubes in spite of 
this allegedly stringent and restrictive law. "238 Indeed, conservation ex-
perts note that "species that occur exclusively on non-federal lands (the 
mcyority of which are in private ownership) appear to be faring consid-
erably worse than species reliant upon the federal land base. "239 
Under the Clinton administration, the FWS adopted vatious poli-
cies, including "Safe Harbor" and "No Surprises," intended to counter 
the perverse incentives created by uncompensated habitat restric-
233 David S. Wilcove, The Promise and the Disappointment of the Endangered Species Act, 6 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 275, 277-78 (1998). 
234 Main et al., supra note 119, at 1263 ("Regulatory mechanisms such as the U.S. En-
dangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) are controversial and have not been particularly effec-
tive at prev~nting the loss of wildlife habitat, especially on private lands."). 
235 Shogren et al., supra note 213, at 1258 ("[T]he consistent exclusion of economic 
behavior in the calculus of endangered species protection has led to ineffective and, in 
some instances, counterproductive conservation policy."). 
236 Lynn E. Dwyer et al., Property Rights Case Law and the Challenges to the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 725,736 (1995). 
237 Bill McKibben, Mare than a Naturalist, AuousoN,Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 92,94-95. 
238 See Rudy Abramson, Wildlife Act: Shield or Sword?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at AI. 
Despite this problem, Bean rejects the claim that the ESA is a "failure." See William & Mary 
Symposium, supra note 87, at 756 (comments of Michael Bean). 
239 Robert Bonnie, Endangered Species Mitigation Banking: Promoting Recovery Thmugh 
Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act, 240 Sci. TOTAL ENv'T 11, 12 
(1999). 
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tions. 240 As Professor Thompson explains, however, "the uncertainty 
and distrust created by prior ESA implementation has hindered the 
government's attempts" to garner landoW:ner participation in these pro-
grams.241 He further suggests that "[a]bsent broader compensation than 
is provided today, even a proactive scheme is likely to encounter evasive 
habitat destruction, since such a scheme would not eliminate the incen-
tive to destroy habitat, but simply narrow the window of opportunity. "242 
"Safe harbor" agreements and the like can only do so much. According 
to Professor Epstein, "[T]hese covenants are not universal in scope, and 
they require confidence that they will be respected over time when the 
remedies for government breach are uncertain at best. Absent strong 
ownership rights, the unmistakable incentive remains: destroy habitat 
now in order to preserve freedom of action later. "243 
III. PERVERSE INcENTIVEs FOR GovERNMENT AGENCIEs 
The anti-environmental effects of uncompensated environmental 
land use regulations are not limited to the effects of such measures on 
private landowners. The lack of a compensation requirement also af-
fects the incentives faced by government agencies. 244 Specifically, the 
lack of a compensation requirement creates incentives for government 
agencies to adopt suboptimal conservation strategies and creates politi-
cal distortions that further frustrate the achievement of environmental 
goals.245 
Regulators and government bureaucrats are economic actors as 
much as anyone else, in that they respond to changes in economic in-
centives on the margin. As a consequence, changes in economic incen-
tives can influence the behavior of government agencies.246 The reac-
tions of government agencies to change~ in incentives may be more 
complicated to model and predict than those of private firms, 247 but 
240 Thompson, supra note 99, at 322; John H. Cushman, Jr., The. Endangered Species Act 
Gets a Makeovrr, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1998, at G2 (describing Habitat Conservation Plans 
and "no surprises" agreements). 
241 Thompson, supra note 99, at 322. 
242 !d. at 354. 
243 Epstein, supra note 34, at 33. 
244 See infra notes 246-336 and accompanying text. 
245 See infra notes 246-336 and accompanying text. 
246 See Terry L. Anderson, The New Resow-ce Economics: Old Ideas and New Applications, 64 
AM.]. Acme. EcoN. 928, 932 (1982) (noting that government bureaucrats, like private 
individuals, face tradeoffs when seeking to maximize their objective function). 
24i See generalfcv Daryl]. Levinson, A1ahing Government Pay: Ma.dwts, Politics, and the Alloca-
tion of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345 (2000) (applying public choice models to 
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this does not mean the effects of such incentives can be ignored. Legal 
changes that alter the incentives faced by agency personnel will alter 
the agency's behavioc 248 
When government agencies impose conservation restrictions on 
private land without paying compensation, they create an incentive for 
private landowners to eliminate, or at least not to invest in, ecological 
amenities on their land.249 At the same time, when government agen-
cies are not required to pay for the costs of such regulatory controls, 
such measures are underpriced relative to available alternatives, and 
regulators are likely to overrely on land use controls.250 The resulting 
perversities are two-fold. As Professors Andrew Morris and Richard 
Stroup explain, the federal government simultaneously "seizes more 
property rights than it needs to protect a given habitat" while providing 
"too little habitat protection over all, as the government avoids the po-
litical costs of the ESA by dragging its feet on actions such as listing spe-
cies."251 
The lack of a compensation requirement also distorts the political 
costs and benefits of agency action in other ways that may further un-
dermine conservation goals.252 Those who seek to affect agency policy 
are forced to invest in manipulating the political costs and benefits to 
agency personnel.253 The off-budget nature of uncompensated regula-
tions further reduces the transparency of conservation policy and may 
undermine political accountability and public oversight of agency ac-
tion, to the potential detriment of environmental conservation.254 
A. ''Fiscal Illusion" 
The idea of "fiscal illusion" is that environmental land use regula-
tions often enable the government to obtain the benefits of land acqui-
sition without bearing the full cost of such actions. Therefore, the gov-
ernment acts under the "illusion" that land use controls are less costly 
government behavior to demonstrate that government cannot be expected to respond to 
forced financial outflows like a profit-maximizing firm). 
248 See infra notes 292-305 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 87-206 and accompanying text. 
250 See infra notes 255-280 and accompanying text. 
251 Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The "Living Constitution, " 
the Third Amendment, and the Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769, 789 (2000). 
252 See infra notes 306-336 and accompanying text. 
253 See infra notes 306-336 and accompanying text. 
254 See infra notes 306-336 and accompanying text. 
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than they actually are.255 When a government agency seeks to advance 
conservation values by purchasing lands, acquiring nonpossessory 
property interests, or providing technical assistance or monetary incen-
tives, it must pay for such measures. When the same agency seeks to 
advance conservation by imposing regulatory limits on private land use, 
however, no payment is required. The economic costs of such regula-
tions borne by the landowners are "off-budget expenditures. "256 Profes-
sor William Fischel notes that, as a consequence, there is little assur-
ance that the government "will truly value the resources it takes from 
the p1ivate sector"257-particularly as compared to those resources that 
are accounted for within agency budgets.25B 
Insofar as the lack of a compensation requirement means that an 
agency does not bear tl1e full costs of imposing land use restrictions on 
private land, such measures will be "underpriced" as compared with 
those policy options for which the agency will be financially responsi-
ble. The lack of a compensation requirement creates the "fiscal illu-
sion" that the measures cost less than they actually do because the costs 
are not borne by the decision-making agency. 259 Because land use con-
trols are underpriced, they will be "overconsumed." Environmental 
agencies will rely upon land use regulations in lieu of alternatives-
such as land purchases, conservation easements, banking, technical 
assistance, and incentive programs-more than would be optimal. 
Where expenditures are on budget, funds must be appropriated 
by tl1e legislature and, insofar as legislatively autl1orized, agencies must 
allocate funds to competing agency priorities and programs. The adop-
tion of land use controls, such as are authorized under section 9 of the 
ESA or section 404 of the CWA, does not impose additional costs on 
255 FISCHEL, supra note 96, at 206. William Fischel defines "fiscal illusion" as "the sys-
tematic underestimating of costs by government decision makers when full compensation 
does not have to be paid." I d. 
256 Thompson, supra note 3, at 288. 
257 FISCHEL, suj;ra note 96, at 144 (citing Louis De Alessi, lmj;lications of Propm·ty Rights 
for Government Investment Choices, 59 AM. EcoN. REv. 13 (1969)). 
258 The failure to account for private costs is not simply a "mistake" by the government. 
Indeed, it may be a deliberate consequence of majoritarian decision making, as political 
majorities (or influential interest groups) impose the costs of their preference for land 
conservation on a minority of landowners. See FISCHEL, sujJTa note 96, at 206. This argu-
ment responds to the claim that the government is just as likely to underestimate the 
benefits of regulatory actions as it is to underestimate the costs of such actions. See id. 
259 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation fa!· Takings: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 620-22 (1984). 
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agencies.2fi0 AB a result, agencies are likely to "overinvest" in such meas-
ures. In effect, the underpricing of land use controls leads to their 
overuse compared to other conservation policy alternatives.2fil AB 
viewed from the agency perspective, land use control is "free," but al-
ternatives are not. Much as consoiption resulted in the military's over-
reliance on labor as a factor input, a no-compensation rule encourages 
the government to overuse land use controls as an input into environ-
mental conservation.262 This is not meant to diminish the importance 
of land use control in environmental conservation, but only to note 
that it can be overused like any factor input. 
Fiscal illusion is a problem insofar as it prevents government agen-
cies from considering the trade-offs inherent in environmental policy. 
AB Professors Morriss and Stroup observe: 
Unlike private land managers, government biologists face no 
opportunity costs to their decisions to place restrictions on 
the use of private land .... Because they are not required to 
compensate a private landowner for reducing the value of the 
landowner's property, they need not consider the value of the 
alternative uses of the land. Indeed, the [Endangered Spe-
cies] Act forbids such considerations.263 · 
Environmentalist organizations and citizen groups are likely to suffer 
from fiscal illusion as well. Such groups often sue federal agencies to 
force greater regulation of private land.264 Such suits can trigger regula-
tory action and limits on private land use, but this does not come at the 
expense of other conservation measures. Just as regulators can be ex-
26° Certainly the adoption or enforcement of regulatory measures entails some costs, in 
terms of personnel time and other agency resources. Such costs are involved in any agency 
action. The point here is that the agency is not bearing the economic cost of the policy 
measure itself, only the costs of implementing or adopting any policy measure. 
26 1 Cf Gary D. Libecap, Book Review, 24J. EcoN. LITERATURE 730, 731 (1986) (review-
ing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAws: A PROPERTY RIGHTS AP-
PROACH TO AMERICAN LAND UsE CONTROLS (1985)) (arguing that compensation rules 
"affect the substitution between land and other inputs"). 
262 William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from the Military 
Draft for the Takings Issue, 20 HARv. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 23, 24 (1996); Robert D. Tollison, A 
Comment on Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 lNT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 139, 140 
(1992). 
263 Morriss & Stroup, supra note 251, at 788-89. 
264 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1331 (11th Cir. 
2006) (suit to require designation of critical habitat for two species of minnows); Cu-. for 
Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 450 F. 3d 930, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2006) (suit 
alleging that FWS violated the ESA by failing to designate critical habitat for an endan-
gered fish species). · 
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pected to overuse land use regulation as compared to other conserva-
tion measures, environmentaJist groups can be expected to seek the 
imposition of such measures more than would be optimaJ. This is be-
cause they do not bear the opportunity costs of conservation, and be-
cause the existing regulatory structure does not provide public interest 
organizations with equivalent means of triggering alternative conserva-
tion measures. 265 Even an organization that seeks to ensure the optimal 
use of resources can suffer from fiscal illusion because the "off-budget" 
nature of land use regulations. 
The by-now familiar case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
which the U.S. Supreme Court decided in 1992, is a good example of 
how regulatory agencies can suffer from "fiscal illusion. "266 The story 
illustrates that when agencies do not bear the costs of their regulatory 
measures, they have a more difficult time identifying whether a given 
land use control is worthwhile.267 
Mter David Lucas purchased two beachfront lots on the South 
Carolina coast, the state legislature adopted a new Beachfront Man-
agement Act and created a coastal regulatory agency, the South Caro-
lina Coastal Council. 268 Although there were homes on either side of 
each of his lots, the Council denied Lucas permission to make similar 
use of his land, claiming the addition of two homes along the coast 
would threaten significant public harm.269 Upset with the Council's de-
cision, Lucas sued. 270 
Lucas' challenge to the Council's regulatory restrictions as un-
compensated takings of his land was ultimately successful.271 The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that unless the development restrictions could be 
justified as inhe1ing in the title to the land itself, tl1e prohibition 
amounted to a taking under the Fifth Amendment.272 In such cases, tl1e 
Court observed, there is a particular risk that government-imposed 
265 See Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Pro-
tection, 12 DuKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 39, 58-64 (2001) (discussing how citizen suit en-
forcement of environmental laws can lead to suboptimal overenforcement). 
266 See generally 505 U.S. 1003 ( 1992). 
267 See infra notes 268-280 and accompanying text. 
268 See James R. Rinehart &Jeffrey J. Pompe, The Lucas Case and the Conflict over Property 
Rights, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990s' PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION, supra note 65, at 67, 77; 
see also Been, supm note 65, at 228-30. 
269 Rinehart & Pompe, supra note 268, at 68, 77. 
270 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009. 
271 !d. at 1031-32. 
272 !d. at I 027-29. 
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land use controls are, in actuality, efforts to produce public benefits at 
private expense. 273 As Justice Scalia noted in his opinion for the Court, 
[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without economi-
cally beneficial or productive options for its use-typically, as 
here, by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural 
state-carry within them a heightened risk that private prop-
erty is being pressed into some form of public service under 
the guise of mitigating serious public harm.274 
Mter additional legal skirmishing over damages, the South Caro-
lina Coastal Council agreed to purchase the lots for $1.5 million.275 Yet 
once the Council was required to pay for the land upon which it sought 
to prohibit development, it determined that prohibition was not so im-
portant after all, promptly selling tl1e property for development.276 
Large houses were subsequently built on each lot, amidst the row of 
houses that already occupied the beachfront block.277 
As the owner of the lots, tl1e state now bore the costs of its deci-
sions as to how the land would be used. The Council was no longer op-
erating under the "illusion" that its actions were cost-free, and its behav-
ior changed accordingly.27B The resources necessary to prevent 
development of two beachfront lots on an already developed beach-
front could better serve tl1e Council's conservation mission if devoted 
to some other purpose. As one state official explained, 'We felt that we 
had an obligation to offer the property to the public and get the high-
est price. "279 Even those who defended the Council's regulations ac-
knowledged that this decision "opens the state to charges of hypocrisy 
when it is willing to have an economic burden fall on an individual but 
not when the funds have to come out of an agency's budget. "280 
Some critics of the "fiscal illusion" argument suggest that "the 
common view of takings payments as an instrument to deter excessive 
regulation depends upon important implicit and, upon examination, 
273 Id. at 1018. 
274 ld. 
275 Rinehart & Pompe, supra note 268, at 82. 
276 ld. 
277 Been, supra note 65, at 239 (noting a five bedroom house was built on one lot, a 
four bedroom house on the other). 
278 See id.; Rinehart & Pompe, supra note 268, at 82. 
279 Rinehart & Pompe, supra note 268, at 82; cJ. Been supra note 65, at 239-40 (provid-
ing a slightly different account of the Lucas aftermath). 
280 H. Jane Lehman, Case Closed: Settlement Ends Property Rights Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB., July 
25, 1993, at 3G (quoting John Echeverria, then of the National Audubon Society). 
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implausible assumptions regarding the incentives regulators face. "281 
Specifically, "regulators are not independent principals; they make pol-
icy decisions at the behest of environmentalists and property owners 
affected by such decisions."282 Others claim that "[t]he notion that gov-
ernments must be forced to pay compensation to ensure that they en-
act only efficient regulation implicitly assumes that government actors 
are the equivalent of rational profit-maximizing firms."283 Not necessar-
ily. Requiring compensation as a means to ensure more efficient and 
better informed agency decisions only assumes that government actors 
respond to changes in incentives on the margin. 
Most critiques of "fiscal illusion" adopt tl1e wrong standard of 
measure, making the perfect the enemy of the good. 284 The relevant 
policy question is not whether a given policy reform will result in the 
paradigmatic efficient outcome. Such outcomes only exist in theoreti-
cal models. Rather, the question is whether, given realistic assumptions, 
a specific reform will move policy in a preferable direction. 285 The sug-
gestion here is simply that requiring compensation to be paid by the 
agency responsible for the land use restriction will improve the agency 
decision-making process on tl1e margin.286 
Professor Daniel Farber suggests that "if we adopt a public interest 
theory of government, internalizing a cost makes no difference," be-
cause "[p]ublic-spirited policymakers would take into account all the 
costs and benefits" of government action irrespective of whether those 
costs are borne by the government.287 Yet tl1is is only the case if one as-
sumes away many of the problems that even the most public-spirited 
government actors will face in policy development and implementa-
tion. Among the most serious of these difficulties is the information 
281 Timothy J. Brennan & James Boyd, Political Economy and the Efficiency of Compensation 
for Takings, 24 CoNTEMP. EcoN. PoL'Y 188, 200 (2006). 
282 !d. at 190. 
283 Vicki Been &Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA 's Investment Pmtec-
tions and the 1\Jisguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 30, 92 (2003). 
284 See, e.g., id.; Brennan & Boyd, supra note 281, at 200. 
285 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Approach, 12J.L. & EcoN. 1, I 
(1969) (noting policy choice is not between "ideal" and "existing imperfect" institutional 
arrangements, but between competing "real" institutional arrangements). See generally NEIL 
K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, EcONOMICS, AND 
PuBLIC PoLICY (1994) (offering a critique of law and public policy analysis that poorly 
executes institutional comparison). 
286 See, e.g., Polasky & Doremus, supra note 6, at 42 ("An advantage of a compensation 
approach is that it improves the outcome when regulators suffer from fiscal illusion."). 
287 Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 288 
(1992). 
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problem. Government agencies face tremendous difficulty in accumu-
lating and processing all of the information relevant to centralized pol-
icy decisions.288 Fiscal illusion exacerbates this problem by distorting 
the price signals that can help inform the agency's judgment. 
The problem of "fiscal illusion" is not dependent on the assump-
tion that "the regulator is nonbenevolent," as some claim.2B9 Rather, it 
is dependent only upon the assumption that even the best inten-
tioned regulators have limited capacities and will, on the margin, be 
influenced by changes in the costs and benefits of given actions. This 
proposition should be indisputable.290 When one recognizes that even 
well-intentioned and proficient regulators will suffer from informa-
tion problems and other government failures, the likelihood of some 
amount of "fiscal illusion" increases greatly. 291 Indeed, insofar as some 
costs of government action are off-budget, this increases the informa-
tion problem for agencies. 
To truly calculate the costs and benefits of a given government 
project, the government decisionmaker needs access to information 
about the preferences and circumstances of all those who are going to 
be affected by the decision. In practice,. no government agency has 
access to such information, nor could it.292 A compensation mecha-
nism can lessen this problem insofar as the potential for compensa-
tion facilitates the generation of prices that are an important and ef-
fective means of transmitting dispersed information about costs and 
benefits in the marketplace.293 Requiring compensation does not 
completely cure the information problem, to be sure, but it does re-
duce it at the margin. Further, as economist Robert Tollison observes, 
288 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REv. 519, 519 (1945) (not-
ing that knowledge required for many planning decisions is dispersed and "never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form"). 
289 See, e.g., Polasky & Doremus, supra note 6, at 42 ("Fiscal illusion, however, assumes 
that the regulator is nonbenevolenl, i.e., that the regulator has goals other than maximiz-
ing social welfare or efficiency."). 
290 See Epstein, supra note 34, at 18 ('The public choice problems associated with admin-
istrative agencies have been sufficiently well documented that one does not need a great 
imagination to know that the maximization of agency influence and power does not coincide 
perfectly with tl1e maximization of social welfare."). See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, PoL-
ICY ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC CHOICE: SELECTED PAPERS BY WILLIAM A. NISKANEN (2004);jAMES 
Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT (1989) 
(describing agency behavior). 
29l See Hayek, supra note 288, at 519. 
292 See id. 
293 CHRISTOPHER THOMAS & S. CHARLES MAURICE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 86-87 
(8th ed. 2005) (describing tl1e importance of marginal analysis). 
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The market for alternative uses of land is highly efficient .... 
A compensation policy basically insures that land prices will 
not be distorted by government projects and that government 
will face relevant market prices for its land acquisitions. Thus, 
compensation allows private markets in land to work effi-
ciently, conveying the correct information about opportunity 
cost to investors and so forth. A no-compensation policy would 
lower the price of land throughout the economy and inject 
uncertainty into the process of investing in real property.294 
345 
Critics of "fiscal illusion" argue that the theory is dependent upon 
the government treating "a requirement to pay compensation as a cost 
to itself rather than to the taxpayers who support it. In practice, of 
course, the costs of compensation are borne by taxpayers, not the regu-
lators who actually make decisions."295 Taxpayers, the argument contin-
ues, may not be particularly responsive to the marginal increase or real-
location of government spending caused by a compensation 
requirement. As Professor Farber points out: 'Taxpayers are an ex-
tremely large, diffuse group. History provides little reason to think they 
\-viii be a powerful political force in resisting small increases in govern-
ment spending. "296 In sum, the money required to compensate land-
owners for the consequences of environmental land use regulation is 
easily lost in the federal budget, such that no taxpayer will feel tl1e con-
sequence.297 
Indeed, the discipline imposed on regulatory agencies derives less 
from tl1e political opposition of taxpayers tl1an from the agency's own 
desire to command resources to achieve its goals.298 Regulatory agen-
cies have set budgets. As a result, they wzll feel the consequences of be-
ing required to pay compensation if it places a constraint on their ac-
tivities. Insofar as a compensation requirement forces an agency to 
consider trade-offs in resource allocation that it did not have to con-
sider in the past, it can be expected to weigh the opportunity costs of 
different conservation strategies.299 It can also facilitate greater over-
sight of agency behavior, as placing the costs of regulatory controls "on 
294 Tollison, supra note 262, at 139. Insofar as a no-compensation rule does lower land 
prices, however, it will lower the cost to land trusts and other nonprofit conservation or-
ganizations of purchasing conservation easements and other interests in land. 
295 Brennan & Boyd, supra note 281, at 190-91. 
296 Farber, mjJra note 287, at 292-93. 
297 See id.; see also Brennan & Boyd, supra note 281, at 190-91. 
298 See Anderson, mpm note 246, at 932. 
299 See Morriss & Stroup, supra note 251, at 788-89. 
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budget" makes it easier to evaluate how an agency is expending its re-
sources. 
Although the empirical evidence of "fiscal illusion" is not as robust 
as that demonstrating the perverse incentives created by uncompen-
sated takings under section 9 of the ESA,3°0 observed agency behavior 
supports the claim. There is no statutory requirement that the FWS 
provide compensation, nor have landowners brought successful chal-
lenges to land use restrictions under section 9 of the ESA in federal 
court.3°1 Moreover, there are various procedural obstacles to bringing 
successful takings challenges under the ESA, including the FWS's reluc-
tance to issue a final determination on whether a proposed use of land 
will violate the ESA. 302 
As Professor Thompson notes, a review of 'Takings Implication As-
sessments" conducted by the FWS "suggests that the FWS does not be-
lieve current takings law significantly constrains their actions under the 
ESA. "303 It also appears that private landowners are aware of the long 
odds against a successful takings claim under the ESA. 304 Worse, the gov-
ernment has no incentive-if even the ability-to make trade-offs when 
implementing current policy. Under the ESA, "there is no explicit rec-
ognition of relative costs and benefits .... A species witl1 high economic 
cost of recovery and possibly low economic benefits has the same stand-
ing as a species with palpably large economic benefits and small 
costs. "305 Similarly, if the FWS declines to regulate one area, this does 
not release resources that can be devoted to a more pressing conserva-
tion priority. Therefore the FWS has no incentive to consider the alter-
native ways of allocating agency resources to maximize attainment of the 
agency's overall conservation objectives because some inputs are under-
300 See infra notes 301-305 and accompanying text. 
301 Heyman, supra note 9, at 162. The only successful takings claims have involved ESA 
restrictions on water rights. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 
49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319-20 (Fed. Cl. 2001). In some cases, the federal government has settled 
cases in which property owners appeared to have potentially meritorious takings claims. 
See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 54,121, 54,122 (Oct. 17, 1997) (granting an incidental take permit to 
Ben Cone); Albert Gidari, The Economy of Nature, Plivate Property, and the Endangered Species 
Act, 6 FoRDHAM ENVTL. LJ 661, 684n.122 (1995) (discussing proposed settlement regard-
ing spotted owl habitat with Anderson & Middleton Logging Co.). 
302 Thompson, supra note 99, at 325-26. 
303 /d. at 336. According to Thompson, "FWS personnel recognize that property own-
ers will have difficulty getting to court prior to exhausting the HCP [habitat conservation 
plan] process and assume that the government will withstand takings challenges if it per-
mits a landowner at least some use of his property." /d. 
304 /d. at 337. 
305 Brown & Shogren, supra note 104, at 6. 
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priced, and the existing statutory structure does not provide for such 
flexibility. Requiring compensation and enabling agencies to consider 
alternatives to land use controls could improve upon this situation. 
B. Political Support and Willingness to List 
The incentives faced by government agencies may further be in-
fluenced by the political responses of landowners affected by the adop-
tion and enforcement of uncompensated land use controls.306 The 
threat of uncompensated takings may cause political opposition and 
other interventions designed to prevent or delay government action 
that could lead to substantial economic losses.307 Insofar as this results 
in less regulation, it will result in less than optimal environmental pro-
tection, particularly if the decline in regulation is not balanced by in-
creases in other conservation efforts. It also poses the risk that conser-
vation policy itself will be associated with uncompensated losses, 
generating opposition to environmental goals, and not simply the in-
equitable means used to achieve them.308 Providing compensation, on 
the other hand, may reduce political and other opposition to valuable 
conservation measures.3D9 
Where government action has the potential to impose sizable eco-
nomic costs on private landowners, it will generate a political re-
sponse.310 In some cases, this response focuses on requiring compensa-
tion for landowners who are injured by regulation. 311 Congress 
considered several takings compensation proposals in the late 1990s, 
and several states have passed takings bills of one sort or another, but 
306 See infra notes 307-336 and accompanying text. 
307 See Thompson, sujJra note 99, at 349-50. 
30B Morrow, supra note 3, at 185 (suggesting '"rural anti-environmentalism' is not an 
inherent cultural belief but a natural, and possibly unavoidable response to the current 
regulatory framework"); see id. at 227-30; see also Thomas D. Feldman & Andrew E.G. 
Jonas, Sage Scrub Revolution? ProjJerty Rights, Political Fmgmentation, and Conservation Planning 
in Southern California Under the Federal Endangered Species Act, 90 ANNALS Ass 'N Al\1. GEOGRA-
PHERS 256, 271 (2000) (reporting that "the introduction of interim land use controls un-
der the ESA polarized attitudes toward property regulation, endangered species, and con-
servation planning in western Riverside County"). 
309 Brennan & Boyd, supra note 281, at 200 ("If property owners have considerable in-
fluence relative to environmental interests, commitments to substantial compensation 
payments can defuse landowner opposition to environmental regulation, which in turn 
leads to more efficient regulatory choices."). 
3Jo Thompson, supra note 99, at 349 ("As generally will occur where property owners 
are threatened by sizable regulatory losses, a minimal compensation rule encourages so-
cietally inefficient investment in political opposition."). 
311 Id. at 350 ("Faced by the risk of uncompensated loss, property holders lobby the 
legislature to weaken proposed laws or provide compensation."). 
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few require compensation·for environmental land use controls.312 Inso-
far as efforts to mandate compensation have failed, political efforts 
have turned to focus on the regulatory process itself. 313 
Under the ESA, various interest groups seek to manipulate the list-
ing process so as to trigger or preempt the imposition of land use re-
strictions.314 More specifically, property owners who own potential habi-
tat for a given species are likely to oppose listing of the species so as to 
prevent regulation of their land.315 The chief reason for focusing on 
the listing process is that once· a species is listed as endangered, restric-
tions on habitat modification and other activities that could harm the 
species are automatic. 316 Species listing decisions are supposed to be 
based upon a conclusion that the best available scientific evidence sug-
gests a species is endangered.317 In fact, as Professors Polasky and 
Doremus note, the relevant statutory provisions do "not require or even 
permit cost-benefit comparison; activities which take listed species are 
prohibited no matter what their economic benefits .... "318 Thus, the 
statute's structure increases the pressure to influence the listing proc-
ess, as. this is the primary means to influence whether the government 
will regulate private land. 319 Those who have studied the listing process 
have suggested that at least some of these efforts have succeeded: 
"[w]here the listing of a species is likely to impose large costs on prop-
312 See supra note 9 (citing legislative initiatives). 
313 See infra notes 314--332 and accompanying text. 
314 Epstein, supra note 34, at 34 ("[D]esignation systems have two substantial costs: one 
is destruction before designation, and the other is the use of the political process to deny, 
delay or deflect the designations that might come."). 
Environmentalist groups have acknowledged that some species listings are sought out 
of a desire to control land use. For example, Andy Stahl of the Sierra Club Legal Defense 
Fund acknowledged that "the ultimate goal" of litigation to list the northern spotted owl 
was "to delay the harvest of old growth forests so as to give Congress a chance to provide 
specific statutory protection for those forests." Sugg, supra note 230, at 53. According to 
Stahl, the owl was a "surrogate" that could ensure "protection for the forests" under the 
ESA. SeeSugg, supra note 230, at 53. 
315 Thompson, supra note 99, at 350. 
316 See Jon A. Souder, Chasing Armadillos Down Yellow Lines: Economics in the Endangered 
Species Act, 33 NAT. REsouRCES.]. 1095, 1137 (1993) (noting that opposition to the listing 
process occurs because "most of the costs of endangered species protection result from the 
initial listing of the species, where no economic balancing is applied"). 
317 See 16 U .S.C. § 1533 (b) (1) (A) ( 2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
318 Polasky & Doremus, supra note 6, at 24. 
319 Yet, as discussed above, increasing regulatory stringency does not necessarily improve 
or increase conservation on private land. See supra notes 71-305 and accompanying text. 
2008] The Environmental Consequences of Uncompensated Land Use Controls 349 
erty owners ... political and legal pressures from landowners often de-
lay the listing or, in isolated cases, even derail it. "320 
Political considerations undoubtedly affect ESA enforcement and 
implementation as well. Theoretically, listing decisions are made purely 
on the basis of the "best scientific evidence available," and political con-
siderations do not intrude.321 In practice, however, political costs and 
benefits have an effect. Large charismatic species, for example, are 
more likely to be listed than less attractive animal species that do not 
have the same political constituency.322 Interest group activity also ap-
pears to influence how quickly species move through the ESA listing 
process.323 At the extreme, this has produced incentives to manipulate 
the scientific evidence supporting species listing.324 Economist Amy 
Ando has observed that "although the FWS does not answer directly to 
the public, the timing of at least some of its decisions does respond to 
pressure originating from tl1ose who bear the costs and benefits associ-
ated witl1 its actions."325 Similarly, the regulated community has often 
sought to modify implementation of federal wetland regulations due to 
the costs such regulations can impose, and such efforts appear to influ-
ence the regulatory behavior of the Army Corps of Engineers.326 
Delay in the listing of a species can benefit those landowners and 
economic interests that would have borne the costs of the ESA's regula-
32° Thompson, supra note 3, at 269. Empirical research has found that interest group op-
position to species listing proposals increase as listings threaten development. See Amy 
Whritenour An do, Economies of Scope in Endangered-Spec.ies Protection: Evidence from Interest Group 
Behavior, 41 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 312, 329 (2001); see also Amy Whritenour An do, Do 
Interest Groups Compete? An Apj;lzcation to Endangered Spec.ies, 114 PuB. CHOICE 137, 137 (2003) 
(finding interest group involvement in species listings increases with the expected costs and 
benefits of such listings). 
321 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A). 
322 Sett e.g., Kerkvliet & Langpap, Sltpra note 231, at 502; Andrew Metrick & Martin L. 
Weitzman, Patterns of Behavior in Endangered SjJec.ies Preservation, 72 LAND EcoN. I, 14-15 
(1996); Don L. Coursey, The Revealed Demand for a Public Good: Evidence from Endangered and 
Threatened Sj;ecies 14 (Univ. of Chi., Working Paper No. 94.214, 1994), available at http:/ I 
harrisschool. uchicago.edu/ About/publications/working-papers/ pdf/wp _94_ 2. pelf. 
323 Amy vVhritenour An do, Waiting to Be Protected Under the Endangered Sj;ecies Art: The Po-
litical Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42J.L. & EcoN. 29,52 (1999). 
324 For a recent example of such manipulation see Juliet Eilperin, RejJort Faults Interio1· 
Appointee; Landowner Issues Trumped Animal Protections, IG Says, WASH. PosT., Mar. 30, 2007, 
at ADS (stating that senior Bush Administration official altered scientific field reports to 
minimize protections for imperiled species). 
325 An do, supra note 323, at 30. 
326 See, e.g., Michael J. Mortimer, I!TegulaT Regulation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water 
Act: Is the Congress or the Anny Corps of Engineers to Blame?, 13]. ENVTL. L. & LIT! G. 445, 464-
68 (1998). 
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tory limitations. At the same time, it can be harmful to conservation.327 
Delay in listing a species increases the opportunity for landowners to 
respond to the perverse incentives created by the ESA.328 It also de-
prives conservation-minded landowners and others of the information 
that a given species is in need of assistance if it is to survive. 
Not only may delay allow for the preemptive destruction of habitat, 
but it also may enable those in the regulated community to marshal 
scientific evidence that may suggest the listing is unwarranted.329 As a 
listing is delayed, there is a possibility that the scientific data upon 
which the potential listing was based could become outdated.33o Em-
pirical research confirms that the longer it takes for a species listing to 
be proposed, its chances for eventual listing appear to decline.331 If list-
ing is the first step toward a species' recovery, political opposition to 
listing is environmentally worrisome. 332 
Theoretically, those property owners negatively affected by federal 
land use controls could form interest groups to protect themselves from 
costly land use regulations. This may be true for some large landowners 
who are part of industry groups tl1at have found ways to accommodate 
the costs of regulation, but less so with smaller landowners.333 Even at 
tl1e height of property rights activism in the 1990s, property rights or-
ganizations were never major players in tl1e political process.334 Further, 
327 Ando, supra note 323, at 34 ("Long delay in the addition of a species to the endan-
gered species list can reduce the likelihood that the species will escape extinction; species 
have even been thought to have become extinct while waiting for fmal action from the 
agency. Thus, delay diminishes the benefits of a listing. It also reduces the costs."). But see Joe 
R. Kerkvliet & Christian Langpap, Success or Failure: Measuring the Effectiveness of the En-
dangered Species Act 1 (Oct. 2002), available at http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract=358720 (finding 
species listing does not correlate with recovery). 
328 Ando, supra note 323, at 36 ("[D]elay can enable private citizens and firms to take 
preemptive irreversible actions (harvesting trees, developing land) on the land that will be 
protected once the listing is made."). 
329 See id. (noting that "[t]iming may also influence outcome" because "delay in the 
early stages of the process probably makes it more likely that a candidate species is sent 
back in the process rather than being moved forward toward listing"). 
33o fd. 
331 ld. at 45. 
332 Thompson, supra note 99, at 350. But see Kerkvliet & Langpap, supra note 327, at 1 
(finding species listing does not correlate with recovery). 
333 See Heyman, supra note 9, at 166 (noting larger developers have an easier time 
complying with habitat conservation requirements than do smaller landowners). More 
generally, there is evidence that environmental regulations can impose disproportionate 
costs on smaller firms. See, e.g., B. Peter Pashigian, The Effect of Envimnmental Regulation on 
Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 16 (1984). 
334 Writer David Helvarg, who is harshly critical of property rights groups, reported that 
"[r]eviews of IRS filings confirm that most of the established [property rights and wise use] 
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victims of government takings are unlikely to be adequately represented 
in the political process because they are unlikely to be repeat political 
players, and are therefore less likely to form influential interest groups.335 
The exception to this is large landowners who face the risk of multiple 
takings and who are more capable of addressing this threat by spreading 
the risk across larger land holdings. Those landowners with dispropor-
tionate political strength may find means of avoiding government impo-
sitions on their land, whether or not compensation is paid.336 
N. MoNEY FOR SoMETHING-THE PoTENTIAL BENEFITS oF CoMPENSATION 
The failure to account for incentives and other economic realities 
may explain some of the failings of current environmental policies. 
Uncompensated land use regulations, such as those imposed under 
section 9 of the ESA, create substantial incentives for landowners to 
destroy and degrade vital habitat for endangered species.337 There is 
also reason to believe that other similarly structured conservation pro-
grams, such as the wetlands program under CWA section 404, produce 
similar incentives, even if not to the same degree.338 The lack of a com-
pensation requirement further induces agencies to adopt skewed pri-
groups ... operate in the $50,000 to $500,000-a-year range." DAVID HELVARG, THE WAR 
AGAINST THE GREENS 123 (1994). By comparison, the combined budgets of the twelve largest 
U.S.-based environmental organizations was two billion dollars in 2003. Paul Driessen, In-
sights Behind Kyoto, CFACT, Dec. 16, 2004, available at http:/ /www.cfact.org/site/view_arti-
cle.asp?idarticle=644&idcategory=4. 
335 See Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REv. 285, 306-07 
(1990); see also Farber, supra note 287, at 290 ("All things being equal, it probably is still 
true that the dispossessed are disadvantaged by the one-shot nature of their involve-
ment."). 
336 See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., A Comment on Economic Analysis and Just Compensa-
tion, 12 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 141, 141 (1992) ("American political lore ... is rife \\~th stories 
of highways being rerouted or other public projects relocated in seemingly inefficient ways 
solely to avoid politically effective communities and landholders."); see also Nicole Stelle Gar-
nett, TheNeglectedPoliticalEconomy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICHL. REv. 101,238-43 (2006). It 
is also worth noting that some landowners benefit economically from the imposition of 
environmental land use controls. Timber giant Weyerhaeuser, for instance, benefited from 
ESA-induced limits on logging on federal lands that curtailed timber supply and drove up 
timber prices. See Bill Richards, Owls, of All Things, HeljJ Weyerhaeuser Cash in on Timbe1; 
WALL ST.j.,June 24, 1999, atA1 ("[L]ogging restrictions to protect the owl have put more 
than five million acres of federal timberland in the Pacific Northwest out of loggers' 
reach-and driven lumber prices through the roof. With huge stands of its own timber, 
Weyerhaeuser is reaping big money from its trees as it saws wood as fast as it can. Owl-
driven profits enabled the company to earn $86.6 million in the first quarter, up 81% from 
a year earlier."). 
337 See supra notes 115-197 and accompanying text. 
338 See supra. notes 198-206 and accompanying text. 
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orities and overrely upon land use controls to achieve environmental 
objectives. 339 
A compensation requirement would lessen the perverse incentives 
created by existing environmental land use controls. First, compensa-
tion would reduce the incentives that discourage conservation on pri-
vate land.340 Some scholars have argued that for government agencies, 
"the incentive effects of compensation are only desirable ... to· the ex-
tent that inefficient projects are deterred. "341 A compensation require-
ment, howevet~ can also encourage government agencies to consider 
the most cost-effective means of implementing specific projects, help 
overcome the information problems faced by centralized government 
agencies, and improve transparency and accountability.342 In this way, 
compensation may not reduce the amount of conservation activity as 
much as it could lead to more optimal conservation measures. 
A. From Conscription to Enlistment 
Providing compensation to landowners who are denied the pro-
ductive use of their land by habitat conservation regulations would go a 
long way toward reducing the resentment and hostility many landown-
ers feel toward endangered species.343 As Professor Thompson summa-
rizes, "A system of complete compensation would reduce both political 
and economic investment by landowners. Property owners would have 
little incentive to oppose the ESA, prematurely develop their property, 
or oth~rwise destroy habitat. "344 Fair market value compensation will 
often fail to compensate landowners for the subjective value they place 
on maintaining control over their own land. Nor will such compensa-
tion reflect the land's nonmarket value as species habitat. Nonetheless, 
compensation would make an important contribution to species con-
servation efforts. 345 
339 See supm notes 255-305 and accompanying text. 
340 See infra notes 343-352 and accompanying text. 
341 Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and just Compensation, 12 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 
125, 129 (1992) (emphasis added). 
342 See infra notes 353-413 and accompanying text. 
343 See Stroup, supra note 121, at 60 (stating that compensation would reduce the "in-
centive fm· covert habitat or animal destruction" and "make landowners much more ame-
nable to cooperation"). 
344 Thompson, supra note 99, at 351-52. 
345 See Zhang, supra note 171, at 163 ("Any attempt to make ESA more effective will 
have to accommodate the need of private landowners and provide them with positive in-
centives for endangered species conservation."). 
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If those who value the preservation of species habitat are required 
to pay for its protection-either through government compensation or 
voluntary private transactions-the incentive to destroy habitat, hide 
information about species populations, and oppose science-based list-
ing decisions largely disappears.346 Moreover, the prospect of economic 
gain from the cost-effective provision of species habitat will direct pri-
vate energies in more positive directions. Landowners respond to op-
portunities to maximize the economic value of their land. For example, 
IP Timberlands learned to manage their lands so as to maximize rec-
reation revenue on timberlands during decades-long timber rota-
tions.347 Similarly, habitat owners will learn to appreciate the eco-
nomic-and perhaps even the ecological-value of their lands.348 One 
does not need to share the ecological values held by many Americans to 
recognize the potential to gain through meeting the demands that such 
values create. Some landowners undertake conservation efforts not be-
cause ecological conservation is an important value to them, but be-
cause it is an important value to others.349 
Compensation can also help transform the relationship between 
the government and private landowners so as to encourage greater 
trust and openness in environmental policy. Many landowners are very 
willing to cooperate with conservation goals, so long as they are not 
forced to bear the lion's share of the cost.350 Many landowners are often 
naturally willing to learn about, and even enhance, the ecological value 
of their land. Again, however, this must be something for which they 
will not be punished economically. Providing compensation reduces 
the threat posed by scientific information about the location and status 
of endangered species.351 Compensation can help encourage landown-
ers to act as if motivated by a conservation ethic in part because it treats 
them as respected conservationists, as opposed to the government's 
346 Epstein, supra note 34, at 35 ("[A] system of voluntary purchase or condemnation 
radically changes the incentives for both sides in the pre-designation period. In this new 
environment, it is to the advantage of an owner to bring valuable habitat to the attention 
of the government, and to take steps to preserve it in its ideal condition .... "). 
347 TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIR0-CAPITALISTS: DOING GooD WHILE 
DOING WELL 4-8 (1997) (describing efforts to improve wildlife habitat and recreation oppor-
tunities on lands owned by International Paper); Holly Fretwell & Michael J. Podolsky, A 
Strategy for Restoring Americas National Pmks, 13 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 143, 155-56 (2003) 
(same). 
348 See ANDERSON & LEAL, suj;ra note 152, at 4-8. 
349 See generally ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 347 (demonstrating how free market ap-
proaches and private entrepreneurs can contribute to environmental conservation). 
35° See supra notes 121-129 and accompanying text. 
35! See supra. notes 207-225 and accompanying text. 
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uncompensated conscripts. Indeed, the threat of uncompensated regu-
latory takings under existing environmental regulations increases the 
potential costs of inducing greater voluntary conservation on such 
lands.352 
B. Cost-Effectiveness and Nonregulatory Approaches 
The positive effect of a compensation requirement on the incen-
tives faced by government agencies may be less obvious, but it is no less 
important than that for private landowners.353 As explained above, re-
quiring compensation transforms private land from an off-budget ac-
quisition to a conservation policy input that must be paid for like any 
other.354 If agencies have sufficient latitude to act upon the incentives 
this change creates-an assumption that does not always hold-they 
can consider the trade-offs inherent in developing conservation policy, 
and allocate scarce government resources so as to achieve the maxi-
mum return.355 Contrary to the claim of some compensation oppo-
nents, the result is less likely to reduce environmental conservation and 
more likely to enhance consideration of the relative cost-effectiveness 
of various strategies, ultimately leading to more optimal conservation 
policies.356 Federal agencies forced to face true budget constraints are 
352 Zhang, supra note 171, at 151 n.1 (noting that although "it might take giant incen-
tives to overcome the threat of large and direct losses with the current command-and-
control powers inherent in the current ESA programs ... absent those draconian (poten-
tial rather than inevitable) penalties, small positive incentives might bring forth much 
habitat protection now being preemptively reduced or destroyed and habitat creation"). 
353 See Epstein, supra note 34, at 3 ("All relevant parties will operate under superior in-
centives if the government is required to pay compensation when it takes land for habitat 
preservation or restricts its ordinary use for the same purpose. The power to initiate 
changes must be offset by the willingness to bear the financial dislocations they induce."). 
354 William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on 
Economic Interpretations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269-70 (1 988) 
(stating that requiring compensation "serves the dual purpose of offering a substantial 
measure of protection to private entitlements, while disciplining the power of the state, 
which would otherwise overexpand unless made to pay for the resources that it con-
sumes"); hines, supra note 100, at 196 ("Compensation adds the private costs to the gov-
ernment's budget and thereby elicits more efficient government behavior."). 
355 Cf Richard A. Epstein, In and Out of Public Solution: The Hidden Perils of Forced and Un-
f(jrced Propert:y Transfer, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT & LAw, supra note 98, 
at 307, 309 ("Constinttional guarantees of property rights do not negate the use of legislative 
power, but only strip away at its excesses. The acid test is whether these property-based guar-
antees improve the ratio of well-designed legislative actions to misguided ones."). 
356 See Elliott, supra note 57, at 1180-81 ("If government must pay for the cost of prop-
erty made valueless by regulation, it has an incentive to regulate more efficiently by look-
ing for regulatory investments that create benefits greater than the costs they incur."). 
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more likely to optimize their function by devoting resources to their 
best uses. 
There are always trade-offs when government agencies devote 
greater resources to one matter over another. For example, the tradi-
tional emphasis on enforcement at the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency came at the expense of scientific and technical research, policy 
development, and other agency priorities.357 Just as the aim of pollution 
control can sometimes be advanced by substituting compliance assur-
ance and technical assistance for greater enforcement efforts, shifting 
resources from land use control to other policy initiatives could yield 
greater environmental returns. 
One of the problems of current conservation policy is that agen-
cies act as if such t:rade-offs do not exist because they do not bear the 
full costs of certain policy measures. 358 If the ESA is failing to save spe-
cies, this may be because the statute does not require government to 
account for the fundamental economic issues of scarcity and oppor-
tunity cost.359 Instead, the statute facilitates greater land use control,360 
yet it is not always to the benefit of environmental conservation. In-
deed, the ESA has not been particularly effective, so reducing gov-
ernmental appetite for additional land use restrictions should not be 
presumed to compromise conservation.361 
As William Fischel observes, a compensation rule "gives the gov-
ernment a choice. It can continue the regulation if it values it above the 
market price."362 If not, it may devote the relevant resources to some 
other goal. If agencies are allowed some discretion in the selection of 
means to achieve statutory goals, a compensation rule also places land 
use control on the same plane as other conservation tools. Thus, the 
costs and benefits of each option may be evaluated, and the agency may 
adopt the most cost-effective combination of measures. 
Federal officials argue that proposals to fund payment out of indi-
vidual agency budgets are "clearly intended to punish a federal agency 
for any action that would inconvenience any property owner to the 
357 See MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE 
WRONG QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 36 (expanded ed. 1994). 
358 See supra notes 255-305 and accompanying text. 
359 Morriss & Stroup, supra note 251, at 787. 
360 See Epstein, sujJra note 34, at 25 (explaining that in the case of one imperiled species 
"the government over a 25-year period spent $253,900,000 to purchase about 360,000 acres 
of land for critical habitat. Yet a single designation for the coastal California gnat-catcher 
brought 3.8 million acres of coastal scrub habitat beneath the jurisdiction of the FWS. "). 
361 See mpra notes 226-243 and accompanying text. 
362 FISCHEL, supra note 96, at 364. 
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slightest degree. "363 Yet the aim is not to "punish" federal officials so 
much as to discipline them, and force them to recognize the trade-offs 
and the social costs of their decisions. In testimony before the U.S. 
House of Representatives in 1999, then-FWS Director Jamie Rappaport 
Clark reported that, 'Taxpayer money spent on compensation for le-
gally required agency actions is money not spent on protection and re-
covering the species needing the protections of the ESA. "364 This is 
precisely the point. Requiring agency expenditures to be on-budget 
forces agencies to report on the true costs of their regulatory actions 
and to acknowledge the trade-offs their policy decisions impose. 
Opponents of takings compensation fear that a compensation re-
quirement would produce the de facto repeal of existing environmental 
laws.365 In the context of court judgments awarding compensation un-
der a constitutional standard, they warn that 'judicial decisions that 
find permit denials constitute takings may alter agency behavior .... As 
large takings judgments mount, agencies will become reluctant to en-
gage in stlict enforcement of laws and regulations .... "366 
As a theoretical matter, where the imposition of land use controls is 
economically efficient, compensation is not an obstacle to sound policy, 
as the "losing" landowners can be compensated out of the surplus.367 As 
a practical matter, given sufficient statutory flexibility, agencies could 
enhance landowner participation in easement acquisition and voluntary 
363 Charles Tiefer, Controlling Federal Agencies by Claims on Their APJ11njniations? The Tak-
ings Bill and the Powe:r of the Pum, 13 YALEJ. ON REG. 501, 511 (1996) (quoting Lance Wood 
of the Army Corps of Engineers). 
364 To EnsU1·e That Landowners Receive Equal Treatment to That Provided to the Federal Gov-
ernment When Property l'Yiust Be Used: Hem·ing on HR 1142 Before the House Comm. on Resources, 
106th Cong. 40 (1999) (testimony of Jamie Rappaport Clark, Director, U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service). 
365 See William & Mary Symposium, supra note 87, at 779 (comments of john Kostyack) 
(arguing that a compensation requirement would make section 9 of the ESA "unenforce-
able"). It should be noted that if a compensation requirement would be so expensive as to 
render existing land use regulations "unenforceable," it cannot also be the case that such 
regulations have minimal impacts on landowners, as some have claimed. See Ely, supra note 
57, at 55 ("[E]nvironmentalists insist that sintations in which regulation of landowners is so 
severe as to pose a takings question are unusual. If that is so, claims of potentially massive 
costs are wildly exaggerated."); Kostyack, supra note 143. 
366 Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 
81 IowA L. REv. 527, 543 (1996); see also id. at 547 ("[T]hese takings cases endanger wetland 
regulatory programs, because adverse decisions may discourage agencies from strictly enforc-
ing wetland laws and regulations."); Sugan1eli, supra note 57, at 580 (stating tl1at compensa-
tion requirements "provide a powerful incentive for agencies to grant permits tl1at wiU harm 
tl1e health, safety and property of neighbors" rather than risk a negative court judgment). 
367 See Fischel, supra note 98, at 352-53. 
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conservation programs, thus reducing the need for compensation pay-
ments under a regulatory approach.36B 
The potential to substitute government land use control with more 
effective conservation strategies can readily be seen in the context of 
wetlands regulation. The costs imposed by the section 404 permitting 
scheme are far greater tl1an the costs of various other wetland conser-
vation and restoration efforts engaged in by both government and pri-
vate actors. As recent analyses demonstrate, "Federal regulation of wet-
lands can be enormously expensive when considered in terms of total 
economic impacts per acre of wetlands conserved. "369 In some in-
stances, the total economic losses imposed by federal wetland regula-
tion can reach $1 million per acre. 370 Yet this is only part of the picture. 
As Economist David Sunding has explained, 'Traditional measures of 
tl1e cost of regulation, namely out-of-pocket cost of obtaining a permit 
and performing mitigation," dramatically understate the total eco-
nomic costs of wetland regulations.371 Additionally, there is little evi-
dence that wetland regulators account for the ecological functions pro-
vided by given wetlands when making permitting decisions.372 Thus, 
insofar as the nation has approached, or even achieved, the Clean Wa-
ter Act's stated goal of "no net loss" of wetlands, it does not appear to 
be the result of increased regulatory stringency.373 
368 See, e.g., Steven D. Shultz, Evaluating the Acceptance of Vilctland Easement Conservation 
Offers, 27 REv. AGRIC. EcoN. 259, 259 (2005) (finding a fifty-six percent acceptance rate of 
wetland easement offers by FWS to North Dakota landowners and suggesting ways to fur-
ther improve acceptance); see also Ely, supra note 57, at 55-56 (discussing incentive based 
conservation programs in Tasmania). 
369 David Sun ding, An Opening for Meaningful Reform?, REGULATION, Summer 2003, at 
30, 31. 
370 !d. at 32. 
371 !d. 
372 David Sun ding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation by Li-
censing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NAT. REsouRCES]. 
59, 86 (2002); Mortimer, sujJra note 326, at 460-64. 
373 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & DEP'T OF THE ARMY, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CON-
CERNING THE DETERMINATION OF MITIGATION UNDER THE CLEAN WATER AcT SECTION 
404(B) (1) GUIDELINES (1990), available at http:/ /www.epa.gov / owow /wetlands/regs/mitigate. 
html (establishing the "no net loss" goal pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1344); Sunding & Zilber-
man, supm note 372, at 72. For more on whether "no net loss" of wetlands was achieved in 
tl1e 1990s, see Jonathan H. Adler, Hi!tlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce 
Clause]wisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 63-66 (1999). 
Of course, there is reason to question whetl1er "no net loss" is tl1e appropriate policy goal, as 
it focuses on a quantitative measure-net changes in wetland acreage-rather than a qualita-
tive goal, such as the provision of particular ecological services. 
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Nonregulatory wetland conservation programs look like a bargain 
when compared to available regulatory alternatives. Wetland conserva-
tion through the purchase of easements or other partial interests in 
land is significantly less expensive than the total costs of conserving wet-
lands through section 404, and the "restoration of wetlands is usually 
much less expensive than conservation. "374 Furthermore, in some cases, 
programs to promote the adoption of conservation practices on work-
ing land will be more cost-effective than land acquisition or retirement 
programs, even if the overall conservation benefits seem smaller.375 U.S. 
Department of Agriculture ("USDA") programs that restore and con-
serve wetlands by obtaining a partial interest in land cost an average of 
$1300 per acre.376 The USDA Wetlands Reserve Program is even more 
cost-effective, restoring wetlands at approximately $600 per acre.377 The 
North American Waterfowl Management Plan-a voluntary partner-
ship program administered by the FWS-has conserved or restored an 
estimated three million acres of waterfowl habitat at a cost of approxi-
mately $230 per acre.378 Another voluntary program run by FWS, Part-
ners for Wildlife, has likewise funded the restoration of over 300,000 
acres of wetland habitat and 350 miles of riparian habitat at a cost as 
low as $100 per acre or less.379 Compared to existing regulatory pro-
grams, these approaches seem quite cost-effective-and are far less con-
troversial. 380 
There is reason to believe that there is an equivalent range in the 
cost-effectiveness of various species conservation measures. There are 
many different mechanisms short of outright acquisition that can be 
used to encourage or ensure species conservation on private land. 381 
Some studies indicate that voluntary conservation agreements can 
374 Sunding & Zilberman, supra note 372, at 84. 
375 Hongli Feng et a!., Environmental Conservation in Agriculture: Land Retirement vs. 
Changing Practices on Working Land, 52]. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 600, 601 (2004). 
376 Sunding, supra note 369, at 34. 
377 Id. 
378 Turner & Rylander, supra note 6, at 124. 
379 Id. at 126. 
380 Privately funded conservation efforts, dollar-for-dollar, appear to be even more cost-
effective. This should not be surprising. As Professor David Sunding explains: "[T]he 
Corps is not fm-ced to pay attention to factor prices. Private groups have better incentives 
to target the land with the highest level of environmental amenities per dollar spent." 
Sun ding, supra note 369, at 35. 
It should also be noted that landowner willingness to participate in various conserva-
tion programs is in part a function of commodity prices. See Shultz, supra note 368, at 260. 
As a consequence, federal policies that increase commodity prices can be expected to un-
dermine nonregulatory conservation efforts. See id. 
381 Main eta!., supra note 119, at 1267-68. 
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achieve many of the results of more permanent measures at a fraction 
of the cost.382 The cost of a conservation easement can be as little as 
thirty percent of the cost of acquiring a fee simple interest in land.383 
Furthermore, land parcels, and their ecological functions, vary greatly 
from place to place.384 Not every acre of habitat for a given species will 
provide the same level of ecosystem services, and therefore not every 
acre should be valued the same. Faced with budget constraints, agen-
cies will have a greater incentive to consider which acres are most im-
portant to conserve, and can increase the conservation returns of 
their investment. A study by Economist Jason Shogren et al. reports 
that "[b]y taking into account that land values vary across the United 
States instead of treating land as homogenous, the costs of protecting 
half the species on the list can be cut by two-thirds."385 
The existence of compensation and tl1e consideration of nonregu-
latory conservation initiatives may also lower the costs of such efforts 
insofar as they facilitate voluntary landowner cooperation.386 At some 
level, the precise response of individual agencies is difficult to pre-
dict.387 However, as Professor Thompson has noted, "What one can 
conclude, with a reasonable degree of confidence, is that broader 
compensation would lead to a more efficient balance among the re-
sources devoted to species protection and recovery."388 
There are many different tools available for the promotion of con-
servation objectives, yet federal policy does not reflect any deliberate 
plan as to the ideal mix of such tools.389 Although rarely relied upon by 
382 I d. at 1270. 
383 Mark L. Shaffer et al., Noah's Oj;tions: Initial Cost Estimates of a National.~}•stem of Habi-
tat Conservation Areas in the United States, 52 BIOSCIENCE 439, 441 (2002). 
384 See Elmendorf, supra note 212, at 428 ("Land is not created equal. From an em~­
ronmental perspective, some areas count more than others.");Jonathan Remy Nash, Trad-
ing Species: A New Direction for Habitat Tmding Programs, 32 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2007) 
(noting that not all habitat for a given species will be equally valuable for conservation of 
that species). 
385 Shogren et al., supra note 213, at 1259. 
386 See Morrow, supm note 3, at 229 (noting rancher willingness to cooperate with "bot-
tom-up" conservation efforts); Salzman, supra note 219, at 896 (noting that encouraging 
landowner participation in conservation programs may cost less than estimated). But see id. 
at 956 (noting that some landowners may be suspicious of government incentive payments, 
fearing that incentive are a precursor to regulation). 
387 Thompson, supra note 99, at 366 ("By lowering or removing property owner oppo-
sition, increased compensation might well free Congress and the FWS to pursue greater 
habitat regulation."). 
388 I d. 
389 Thompson, supra note 3, at 246 ('The federal government did not consciously plan 
the current mix of regulation, governmental acquisition, grants, and tax incentives. Nor 
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regulatory agencies, a recent review of nonregulatory alternatives has 
noted that "voluntary mechanisms (such as fee simple purchase, ease-
ments, conservation banking, and subsidies) are an effective and flexi-
ble method for targeting low-cost land with high-quality habitat. "390 In 
addition to various federal incentive programs, there are an estimated 
four hundn;d state incentive programs covering approximately seventy 
million acres of private land. 391 These programs range from financial 
incentives and easement purchases to education and technical assis-
tance of various sorts.392 
Requiring compensation, by itself, is not sufficient to encourage 
more efficient regulatory action if the agency itself is not liable for 
compensation.393 As Professors Vicki Been and joel Beauvais note, "Be-
cause politicians and bureaucrats do not maximize profits, having to 
expend funds to cover a compensation award will not necessarily have 
any effect on their decision, unless those expenditures make it harder 
for the decisionmaker to achieve whatever it is trying to maximize. "394 
This means agencies must themselves bear the costs of their decisions. 
At present, the federal government pays court-awarded takings 
compensation claims out of the federal 'judgment fund," rather than 
out of specific agency appropriations or land-acquisition funds. 395 As a 
consequence, when compensation is required under the current sys-
tem, it does not affect agency operations.396 This approach enables 
agencies to implement their environmental programs without any 
meaningful consideration of the costs imposed on landowners or the 
has Congress or the executive branch ever thought carefully about the ideal mix of con-
servation tools. Little, if any, thought has been given to the advantages and disadvantages 
of each approach, the most appropriate setting in which to use each method, or the extent 
to which tl1e current approaches reinforces or undermines each other."). 
390 Gregory M. Parkhurst & Jason F. Shogren, An Economic Review of Incentive Mecha-
nisms to Protect Species an Private Lands, in SPECIES AT Rrsrc UsiNG EcoNOMIC INCENTIVES TO 
SHELTER ENDANGERED SPECIES ON PRIVATE LANDS 65, 121 (jason F. Shogren ed., 2005). 
391 See jason F. Shogren, lntraductian, in SPECIES AT RrsK: UsiNG ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
TO SHELTER ENDANGERED SPECIES ON PRIVATE LANDS, supra note 390, at 1, 10. 
392 !d. 
393 Daryl Levinson notes that "if the compensation is paid out of a general fund, then 
[regulators] will be indifferent as to the takings price of land." Levinson, supra note 24 7, at 
382 n.106. 
394 Been & Beauvais, supra note 283, at 92. 
395 Tiefer, supra note 363, at 505; cJ. id. at 506 ("By contrast, Congress funds condem-
nations through annual appropriations. Typically, it funds large-scale condemnations, such 
as the acquisition of land to expand a national park or forest, through a separate appro-
priation dedicated largely or wholly to that kind of object."). 
396 !d. at 512 (noting that the current system "completely insulate [s] agencies from the 
fiscal impact of constitutional takings suits"). 
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cost-effectiveness of alternative conservation strategies. Alternatively, 
financing judgments from agency budgets would affect policy choices, 
in particular because money spent on takings claims could not be spent 
elsewhere. 397 
If conservation agencies are required to pay compensation, and 
face meaningful budget constraints, they will seek lower-cost means of 
achieving their conservation objectives. At the same time, private land-
owners will have greater inc en rives to find ways of providing conserva-
tion benefits at a cost government can afford.398 As in private markets, 
there are potential economic rewards for environmental entrepreneurs 
who uncover means of providing better services at a lower cost. This 
encourages an organic market-driven discovery process that leads to 
greater innovation and cost-effective means of achieving societal goals. 
Critics of a compensation requirement are correct that a regulator 
"may pay little attention to a compensation award unless having to pay 
compensation to property owners makes it harder for the decision-
maker to achieve whatever he or she is trying to maximize. "399 This is 
precisely why allowing mandated compensation to be paid from a sepa-
rate account, such as the federal judgment fund, is insufficient.400 It 
also points to the need for a compensation requirement to be paired 
with programmatic reforms that ensure conservation agencies have the 
freedom and discretion to make policy trade-offs and substitute other 
conservation measures for compensated land use controls.401 - If com-
pensation is required and if agencies are in position to evaluate alterna-
tives to regulation, there is the potential for improved priority-setting 
and greater adoption of more optimal conservation strategies. 
C. Transparency and Accountabilit_y 
Compensation paid directly from. the relevant agency's budget 
would be likely to have several political effects. First, it would reduce 
political opposition to government conservation actions, such as the 
397 Id. at 516 (explaining that "the charging of agency appropriations for such claims 
radically alters the politics of controlling agency operations ... [and] affects the amount 
of funds left over for other objects of funding"). In theory, if an agency were consistently 
to lose takings suits that were paid out of the Justice Department's judgment fund, it is 
conceivable that Congress would respond in a way that is adverse to the agency. In prac-
tice, however, there is little evidence of this. In any event, such responses are unlikely to 
provide much discipline insofar as they are so indirect. 
398 Stroup, su.pm note 121, at 60. 
399 Been, sujJm note 65, at 248. 
400 See supra notes 395-397 and accompanying text. 
4°1 See supm note 305 and accompanying text. 
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listing of endangered species or the adoption of more expansive defini-
tions of wetlands and valuable ecosystems. 402 Second, and perhaps 
more important, it would encourage a greater consideration of trade-
offs and cost-effectiveness in agency decision making. 403 Further, a 
compensation requirement can increase transparency in agency deci-
sion making and improve public accountability.404 
Insofar as the costs of regulation are brought to bear in the policy-
making process at present, it is only indirectly. Those burdened by such 
regulations may seek to intervene politically to alter agency pliorities, 
but such intervention does not further tl1e goal of efficient resource 
allocation nor does it support transparent evaluation of costs and bene~ 
fits. 405 Rather, it undermines tl1e development of sound conservation 
policy. 
Placing the full costs and benefits of conservation programs "on-
budget" can facilitate the consideration of trade-offs \-vi thin tl1e budget-
ary and agency planning processes. 406 Whatever the imperfections or 
pathologies of the existing appropriations process, it at least frames re-
source allocations as involving questions of t:rade-offs. Funds devoted to 
program A are not available for program B, and vice-versa. This fur-
thers transparency and accountability in government decision making. 
Requiring compensation ccin even affect interest-group behavior and 
discipline the government tendency to prefer some constituencies over 
others. 407 In contrast, as Professor Thompson explains, "regulatory pro-
grams generally eschew full consideration of costs, and thus the costs of 
regulatory programs are addressed in political skirmishes that occur 
behind closed doors rather than in an open, rational fashion. "408 
As James Q. Wilson has observed, it is often difficult to measure 
the effectiveness of government action: "Suppose a police officer walk-
ing a beat makes no arrest. That can mean either tl1at no crime oc-
curred or that the officer could solve none of the dozens of crimes that 
did in fact occur. "409 By the same token, the actual environmental per-
4°2 See supm notes 306-336 and accompanying text. 
403 See supm notes 255-305 and accompanying text. 
4°4 See infra notes 405-413 and accompanying text. 
405 Thompson, supra note 3, at 289. 
4°6 See id. ("Where the government directly finances the cost of conservation, it will 
generally engage in a reasoned, albeit political, balancing of tl1e costs and benefits of vari-
ous levels of conservation."). 
407 See Ron Giammarino & Ed Nosal, Loggers Versus Campers: Compensation for the Taking 
ofPmprrrty Rights, 21J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 136, 138 (2005). 
408 Thompson, supra note 3, at 289-90. 
4°9 WILSON, supra note 290, at 155. 
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formance of various conservation programs should not be measured by 
the number of enforcement actions, or even the amount of regulatory 
activity. What actually matters are the results on the ground: Are species 
being conserved? Are ecological resources protected? And so on. To 
the extent that agency policies are off-budget, it is more difficult to 
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of their various programs and 
weigh potential alternatives.410 Without a consistent metric of costs, it is 
more difficult to ensure that any resources are allocated in a sensible 
fashion. 
It is well understood that "[b]ureaucrats also tend to favor pro-
grams with visible benefits and invisible costs. "411 As Wilson notes, 
'There is a kind of Gresham's Law at work in many government bu-
reaus: Work that produces measurable outcomes tends to drive out 
work that produces unmeasurable outcomes. "412 This problem is mag-
nified when landowners are not compensated when land use regula-
tions reduce the potential uses of their land, and agencies can treat 
land use regulation as a free, off-budget factor input. As Professor Ep-
stein states, a "compensation requirement forces the government and 
the public to make explicit trade-offs between different goods, in order 
to determine their value to the polity at large."413 With land conserva-
tion on-budget alongside other conservation tools, it would be easier 
for the public-and their political agents-to determine whether con-
servation agencies are acting in an effective and responsive manner. 
CoNcLusiON 
Most environmental regulation proceeds from the assumption that 
government action is a necessary and appropriate response to the 
negative environmental consequences of private activities. If private 
economic activities create harmful effects on other persons and their 
properties, the reasoning goes, then government regulation is neces-
sary to limit such harms. In economic terms, government action is nee-
41° For this reason, many policy analysts recommend the adoption of a "regulatory 
budget" to help keep track of regulatory costs. See Robert W. Hahn, Achieving Real Regula-
tory Reform, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 143, 152 (advocating use of a regulatory budget); Sam-
uel Hughes, Regulatory Budgeting, 31 PoL'Y Sci. 247, 248 (1998); Harvey S. James, Jr., Im-
plementing a Regulatory Budget: Estimating the Mandated Private Expenditure of the Clean Air Act 
and Safe Drinhing Water Act Amendments, 31 PoL'Y Sci. 279, 279 (1 998); Fred Thompson, 
Toward a Regulatory Budget, 17 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 89, 89 (1997). 
411 Michael Copeland, The New Resource Economics, in THE YELLOWSTONE PRIMER 13, 18 
(John A. Baden & Donald Leal eds., 1 990). 
412 WILSON, supra note 290, at 161. 
413 Epstein, sujira note 34, at 37. 
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essary to control or "internalize" the externalities associated with pri-
vate land use. In the language of the common law, the government 
should prohibit those activities that constitute a trespass or nuisance to 
private or public rights. 
In the pollution context, this conventional reasoning is straight-
forward. Since the earliest days of the common law, it has been under-
stood that a property owner's right to use his or her land exterids only 
to a point where such use infringes upon a neighbor's equivalent right. 
In modern environmental law, however, government regulation is ex-
pected to control private land uses that do not impose harms on 
neighboring properties. The regulated activities may undermine the 
provision of public goods-such as species habitat or ecosystem ser-
vices-or transgress commonly held environmental preferences. Regu-
lating private land use on such a basis results in far more extensive 
regulation of private land use than traditional rationales for govern-
ment intervention would have contemplated. 
An additional, unstated premise of much contemporary environ-
mental regulation is that government intervention is an effective means 
df addressing environmental concerns. Upon identifying an externality 
or alleged "market failure," policymakers routinely jump to the conclu-
sion that government regulation or some other intervention is war-
ranted, without first considering whether such action will be effective 
or whether it represents an improvement over the status quo ante. As a 
consequence, much environmental regulation has been adopted with 
insufficient attention to its consequences and potential alternatives. 
This Article demonstrates that there are serious negative environ-
mental consequences to certain land conservation measures, particu-
larly those that regulate private land use in an effort to ensure the ade-
quate provision of species habitat. The costly nature of contemporary 
land use controls, such as those imposed under section 9 of the ESA, 
combined with the lack of compensation for those landowners who 
find tl1eir property rights effectively redefined by government edict, has 
made these measures particularly ineffective at achieving their stated 
environmental goals. In the context of habitat conservation under the 
ESA, economic theory and increasing empirical evidence suggest that, 
at least in the context of private land, land use regulations are likely 
doing more harm than good. 
Providing compensation for private landowners whose rights to 
make productive use of their land are restrained by nonnuisance-related 
environmental land use controls has several potential environmental 
benefits. First, at least in the context of the ESA, providing compensa-
tion could significantly reduce tl1e perverse incentives landowners have 
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to destroy habitat, refrain from habitat creation, and refuse to cooper-
ate with scientific research about the condition of imperiled species. 
Second, a compensation requirement can facilitate greater considera-
tion of which environmental conservation measures will be most cost 
effective. If agencies are forced to pay for the acquisition or extin-
guishment of traditional land use rights, the costs of these actions may 
be compared vvith available alternatives, ranging from the voluntary 
acquisition of easements to conservation incentives to the direct sub-
sidization of conservation and ecological restoration activities. This has 
the potential to improve internal agency decision making, enhance 
agency accountability, and facilitate greater public participation in rele-
vant environmental policy decisions. More broadly, a legal regime that 
provides greater protection for property rights will create a stronger 
institutional framework for the pursuit of environmental and other so-
cial goals.414 
Compensation for regulatory takings is hardly a panacea to the ails 
of environmental protection. Many environmental programs are fail-
ing, either because they have become outdated or because they were 
never particularly effective.415 Partisan politics and the demands of po-
litical organization further hamper the creation and implementation of 
effective environmental policy. Too often, public attention and gov-
ernmental efforts focus on relatively insignificant environmental risks 
while serious ecological problems languish in the background.416 
Solving the environmental challenges of the twentieth century-
let alone beginning to address the environmental problems of the 
414 See generally Louis De Alessi, Gains from. PJiva.te-Property: The EmpirimlEvidmce, in PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS: CoOPERATION, CoNFLICT & LAw, supra note 98, at 90, 108 ('The evidence in 
this chapter suggests that individual or communal property rights promote investment in 
maintaining and improving resources, development of new instinttions and technologies, 
and faster, fitller response to changes in circumstances."); Seth W. Norton, Property Rights, the 
Environment, and Economic Well-Being, in WHo OwNs THE ENVIRONMENT? 37, 51 (Peter]. Hill 
& Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998) ('The data presented [in this chapter] show that environ-
mental quality and economic growth rates are greater in regimes where property rights are 
well defined than in regimes where property rights are poorly defined."). 
415 See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Gmen: A New Appma.ch to Envimnrn.enta.l Protec-
tion, 24 HARv.J.L. & PuB. POL'v 653,661-67 (2001). 
416 In some cases, regulations are not even focused on alleviating environmental risks 
as much as they are designed to benefit particular interest groups. See general~~ ENVIRON-
MENTAL PoLITICs: PuBLIC CosTs, PRIVATE REWARDS (MichaelS. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. 
eels., 1992) (describing the influence of special inte1·ests on environmental policy); Jona-
than H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirt~v Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in PoLITICAL 
ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 1, 1 (Terry L. Anderson eel., 
2000) (same); Todd]. Zywicki, Envimnmental Externalities and Political Extemalities: The Po-
liticalEconomy oJEnvimnm.entalRegulation and Reform, 73 TuL. L. REv. 845 (1999) (same). 
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twenty-first-requires a willingness to reconsider the presumptions and 
prejudices that have guided environmental policy to date. In this re-
gard, it is time for environmental policy leaders to reconsider their op-
position to compensating landowners for regulatory takings in envi-
ronmental law. Such a policy is anything but "anti-environmental." 
Indeed, for imperiled species and certain other ecological resources, it 
may be the most pro-environmental option on the table. 
